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The Legitimate Rights of Public Shareholders
Lawrence E. Mitchell*

Abstract
In recentyears there has been significantongoing academicdebate over the
expansion ofpublic shareholders'participationrights in corporategovernance.
The debate has accompanieda dramatic increase in institutionalshareholder
and hedgefund activism attemptingto influence the conduct ofcorporateaffairs.
The legitimacyofshareholderparticipationrights depends upon the actual
role public shareholdersplay in contributing to the corporation'sfunction of
providing goods and services and, ultimately, to economic growth and social
welfare. Few in the debate have stopped to examine this question. This Article
presents originalempiricalevidence thatdemonstratesthatpublic shareholders
do not, on net, contributecapitaltofinance industrialproduction,andinfact are
net consumers of corporate equity. Moreover, their investment incentives
significantly distort the behavior of corporate managers who place strong
emphasis on stock price at the expense of long-term business health, afact that
has played some role in the current global financial debacle. The logical
conclusion is thatpublic shareholders'rightsshould,ideally, be eliminated,and
certainly not expanded or enhanced.
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. Introduction
For a decade or more before the American economy lay in its current
shambles, our system of corporate governance had come under serious attack.
Shareholders and their advocates had arisen from their slumber and had begun
to demand the right to participate in corporate decisionmaking.' For over a
decade, and accelerating during the pre-panic years, activist shareholders,
typically institutional investors and hedge funds, asserted their power to insist
that the corporations in which they invested take the specific actions they
desired.2 These institutional initiatives have included proposals to allow
shareholders to advise boards on executive compensation, to require that
1. See Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, Shareholders as Proxies: The Contours of Shareholder
Democracy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1503, 1506 (2006) (arguing that attempts at shareholder
activism have periodically occurred throughout modem corporate history, but until recently,
none met with any meaningful success).
2. See Anat R. Admati, Paul Pfleiderer & Josef Zechner, Large ShareholderActivism,
Risk Sharing,andFinancialMarket Equilibrium,102 J. POL. EcON. 1097, 1098 (1994) ("Large
shareholders, and particularly institutional investors, have become increasingly active in recent
years."); Thomas H. Noe, InvestorActivism andFinancialMarket Structure, 15 REv. FiN. STUD.
289, 289-90 (2002) (stating that the common paradigm for shareholder activism is active
monitoring by numerous moderate-size blockholder institutions that pursue activist policies);
Sunil Wahal, Pension Fund Activism and Firm Performance, 31 J. FIN. & QUANTITATWE
ANALYSIS 1,8-10 (1996) (discussing how activist shareholders insisted that firms take various
actions over a seven year period).
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directors be elected by majority vote of the shareholders (in contrast to the
plurality rule that traditionally dominates), to remove takeover defenses like
poison pills and staggered boards, to insist upon proxy access, and to eliminate
broker voting.3 Activist hedge funds have been even more aggressive, often
successfully demanding that corporations either sell themselves or divest
themselves of portions of their businesses, that chief executives resign or be
dismissed, and that corporations undertake major restructurings to "return
value" to shareholders while piling on corporate debt.4
Their efforts have been aided by the work of prominent, and increasingly
activist, scholars, led forcefully by Lucian Bebchuk, who have mounted an
aggressive campaign to enhance shareholder voting rights.5 While their efforts
have been controversial, 6 they have garnered significant attention and have
3. See, e.g., Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, FiduciaryDutiesfor Activist Shareholders,
60 STAN. L. REv. 1255, 1274-83 (2008) (describing proposed changes in shareholder voting
rules and the rise of the "activist shareholder").
4. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and
CorporateControl, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1021, 1029-40 (2007) (providing various examples of
hedge funds' activist behavior). See generally William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and
Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375 (2007) (examining the results ofhedge fund activism in
terms of shareholder value). Bratton emerges with a fairly benign view of activist hedge fund
behavior. Id. at 1427-28.
5. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Casefor IncreasingShareholderPower, 118 HARv. L.
REV. 833, 913 (2005) (arguing for shareholder power to initiate and adopt rules-of-the-game
decisions); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the ShareholderFranchise,93 VA. L. REv. 675,
694-709 (2007) (arguing for reform of corporate elections to make directors more responsive to
shareholders); Lucian A. Bebchuk, ShareholderRights andthe DGCL, 26 DEL. LAW. 16, 16-17
(2008) (arguing that shareholders in the United States have weaker rights than shareholders in
the United Kingdom and other common law countries). Bebchuk's activism on behalf of
expanded shareholder rights may be explored at the following URL: http://www.law.
harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuck/policy.shtml. See also Lisa M. Fairfax, Making the Corporation
Safe for ShareholderDemocracy, 69 OHIo ST. L.J. 53, 79-96 (2008) (providing a nuanced
argument that shareholder democracy has the potential to help a variety of corporate
stakeholders).
6. See Iman Antawabi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53
UCLA L. REv. 561, 562-64 (2006) (evaluating director-primacy theories); Theresa A.
Gabaldon, Like a FishNeeds a Bicycle: Public Corporationsand Their Shareholders,65 MD.
L. REv. 538, 539 (2006) (arguing against shareholder primacy); Martin Lipton & William
Savitt, The Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. REv. 733, 734 (2007) (arguing that
Bebchuk's theory is founded on myths and does not account for the negative consequences of
shareholder activism); Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of ShareholderControl,93 VA. L.
REv. 789, 791 (2007) (arguing that shareholders prefer firms with strong board control); see
also Stephen M. Bainbridge, DirectorPrimacyand ShareholderDisempowerment,119 HARV.
L. REv. 1735, 1744-51 (2006) (noting that limited shareholder voting rights is corporate law's
majoritarian default and arguing that shareholder power will either be little used or misused).
Bainbridge probably is the most prominent legal scholar advocating a strictly board-centered
model of corporate governance.
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created synergy with the actions of shareholders, acting principally through
shareholder advisory services, and with activist institutional investors, to put
substantial
pressure on businesses and lawmakers to expand shareholder
7
rights.
The objective of the so-called reformers, and much of the defense, is
centered on the question of which mode of corporate governance-a director
primacy model or a shareholder-centric model-holds the greatest promise for
enhancing firm value.8 While the meaning of the phrase "firm value" typically
is left ambiguous, the underlying assumption in much of the debate appears to
be that firm value equates to share price. 9 A secondary objective, which I do
not address because I believe that it serves principally as a rhetorical device and
tends not to be taken very seriously, at least in the corporate and economics
literature, is that the corporation is somehow a democratic institution and
shareholders are its citizens.' 0
7. See Martin Lipton & Paul K. Rowe, The Inconvenient Truth About Corporate
Governance: Some Thoughts on Vice-ChancellorStrine's Essay, 33 J. CORP. L. 63, 68-69
(2007) (summarizing the rise and profitability of shareholder advisory services); Leo E. Strine,
Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground: Reflections on the Shared Interests of
ManagersandLabor in a More RationalSystem ofCorporateGovernance,33 J. CORP. L. 1, 56 (2007) (explaining the corporate governance industry).
8. Antawabi, supra note 6, at 562-64.
9. One exception is Lynn Stout, who notes that academics may work on the assumption
of this equivalence. Stout, supra note 6, at 801. It is a point I have also made elsewhere.
LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA'S NEWEST EXPORT 4 (2001)

[hereinafter

MiTCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY]

(exploring the pathologies of the

stockholder primacy norm). It strikes me that the same equation typically is made by those who
advocate a director primacy model as those who advocate a shareholder primacy model. This
equation is not, of course, universally accepted. For one of the seminal statements of the
fundamental value perspective, see BENJMN GRAHAM & DAVID L. DODD, SECURITY ANALYSIS
47-50 (1934) (stating that share price does not automatically equate to firm value, but the two
may converge at certain times).
It is striking that the debate offers no empirical evidence beyond the obvious fact that, as a
historical matter, shareholders have exercised little participatory power in American corporate
policy. While Bebchuk, in particular, cites a few articles that might suggest that shareholder
participation has a positive effect on "firm value," those few studies have been sufficiently
debunked by Lynn Stout to obviate the need for me to repeat the analysis. See Stout, supra note
6, at 800.
Interestingly, Bebchuk himself has contributed to the development of an economic model
that predicts potentially negative effects from short-term market pressures, and this at a time
when, as I shall discuss, the stock market was considerably less volatile than it subsequently
became. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Lars A. Stole, Do Short-Term ObjectivesLead to Under-or
Over-investment in Long-Term Projects?, 48 J. FIN. 719, 720 (1993) (arguing that imperfect
information will cause underinvestment or overinvestment). This Introduction refers to a much
larger and more complete body of literature that has yet to find any positive effect of shareholder
governance, or even corporate governance, on "firm value," however measured.
10. See Tsuk Mitchell, supranote 1,at 1505 (analyzing American corporate democracy as
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Lost in the debate are three essential questions that necessarily drive it
toward an appropriate resolution. Why do we have public corporations? What
is it that shareholders contribute to them? How does this affect our view of
shareholders' legitimate rights? My answers are simple. First, the principal
purpose of corporations, public as well as private, is to make things and sell
things, to provide services to customers, and in the process, to employ people,
all to the ends of wealth creation, economic growth, and social welfare."
Second, public shareholders contribute little or nothing to this process, not
even, as the empirical evidence I present demonstrates, their capital.' 2 (It is
worth noting that evidence that any of the processes of corporate governance
has a meaningful effect on economic growth is almost nonexistent.) 3 The
conclusion is that enhanced share price is at best a byproduct of corporate
activity that, as I will argue, has distorted the productive incentives of corporate
14
management to the potential long-term harm of American industry.
Therefore, public shareholders ought to have no rights beyond those of
largely a rhetorical device).
11. See LAWRENCE E. MrrCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY: How FINANCE TRrUMPHED
OVER INDUSTRY 8-9 (2007) [hereinafter MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY] (arguing that

the modem public corporation was formed in large part because of trust promoters' incentives);
Lawrence E. Mitchell, Vulnerability andEfficiency (Of What?), 2 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 153, 153
(2005) (arguing that good corporate law should facilitate the efficient production of goods and
services); see also Lipton & Rowe, supra note 7, at 66-67 (arguing that a key mission of the
corporation is wealth maximization); Strine, supranote 7, at 3 (arguing that management and
labor view the corporation as more than a nexus of contracts).
12. Infra Part I1.
13. To date, no strong empirical correlation of which I am aware has been found. Ross
Levine, Financeand Growth: Theories and Evidence, in 1A HANDBOOK ECoN. GROWTH 874
(Philippe Agnion & Steven N. Durlaf eds., 2005) [hereinafter Levine, Financeand Growth];
Stout, supra note 6, at 800 n.33. But see the interesting discussion, including the conclusion
that "financial development seems intimately tied to corporate governance," while
acknowledging the ambiguity of the evidence. Randall K. Morck & Lloyd Steier, The Global
History of CorporateGovernance: An Introduction40 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working
Paper No. 11062, 2005), availableat http://www.nber.org/papers/w11062.
14.

See MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY, supranote 9, at 4-10 (stating that the

focus on share price causes the problem of managerial myopia that in turn leads to firm
problems); Greta R. Kippner, The Financializationof the American Economy, 3 SOcIOECONOMIC REv. 173 (2005); Ozgur Orhangazi, Financializationand CapitalAccumulationin
the Nonfinancial CorporateSector: A Theoretical and EmpiricalInvestigation on the US
Economy (Pol. Econ. Res. Inst. Working Paper Series No. 149, 2007), available at
http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/working... 101.../WP 149.pdf; Thomas I. Palley,
Financialization: What It Is and Why It Matters (Levy Econ. Inst. Working Paper No. 525,
2007), available at http://www.levy.org/vdoc.aspx?docid--971; Engelbert Stockhammer,
Financializationand the Slowdown ofAccumulation (Vienna Univ. of Econ. and Bus. Working
Paper No. 14, 2000), available at http://epub.wu-wien.ac.at/dyn/virlib/wp/eng/showentry?
ID=epub-wu-01_18e.
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receiving information about the corporations in which they invest and selling
their shares.' 5 The director primacy model ought to remain our paradigm of
corporate govemance.16
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II presents my empirical research
demonstrating that public equity has had virtually no significant role in
financing American industry, and indeed, that the demands of public
shareholders, manifested by the behavior of shareholder activists and the
market, have resulted in an industrial base heavily overburdened by debt. To
be more precise, while extensive evidence documents large numbers of
common stock public offerings, 17 on balance American public shareholders
have been net consumers, rather than net providers, of corporate equity. 18 The
real "owners" of the risk capital of American business are creditors, not
shareholders, yet shareholders have the only legal rights of control.' 9 While it
15. It may be that there is no practical alternative to shareholder election of directors. I
take this up in Part IV.
16. I am, for the purposes of this Article, indifferent as to which model of director
primacy should be privileged, the Bainbridge model or the Blair and Stout model. See
Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 1744-51 (arguing that limited voting rights for shareholders is
corporate law's majoritarian default); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production
Theory of CorporateLaw, 85 VA. L. REv. 247, 257-76 (1999) (explaining team production
analysis). It should be clear from my earlier work discussing the board's mediating function
that I favor the latter. Lawrence E. Mitchell, A CriticalLookat CorporateGovernance,45 VA.
L. REv. 1263, 1273-83 (1992).
17. See, e.g., Jay R. Ritter, IPO Data, http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm (last visited
Sept. 18, 2009) (providing links to PDFs, charts, and articles compiling his data on Initial
Public Offerings (IPOs)) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
18. See Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, FinancingDecisions: Who Issues Stock?,
76 J. FiN. ECON. 549, 579 (2005) (demonstrating that equity offerings are far more frequent and
regular than had been supposed). While Fama and French's findings are interesting, they are
not necessarily inconsistent with my data. In the first place, they include within their study
substantial amounts of privately issued equity, including stock issued in private placements and
for employee stock options and, indeed, attribute to the latter a substantial proportion of new
equity issuances. Id. at 574. The other large block of equity issued is in the context of mergers,
in which the stock of the merging corporation disappears, so that the net effect on outstanding
public equity probably is relatively minimal. Id. at 574-75. In addition, much of the work that
supports their conclusions relates to the ratio of equity to debt. Id. at 557-58. But they use
Compustat and Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) data, neither of which accounts
fully for off-balance sheet financing which, as I will show in Part II, infra, comprises the bulk of
recent debt financing. Id. at 556, 558, 561, 564,576, 581. Compustat does provide off-balance
sheet rental payments for the first five years of operating leases on a company-by-company
basis. Fama and French do not appear to have relied on this data, and if they had, it would
nevertheless dramatically understate off-balance sheet financing. CRSP does include
capitalized lease obligations but it is not clear how this affects their data. See id. at 581
(explaining the composition of the data used in the paper).
19. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, PrivateDebt and the MissingLever
of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 1209, 1212-15 (2006) (stating that creditors
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is possible these rights could serve industrial development in a positive way, it
seems economically backward to allow20 those with the least real capital at risk to
have power over those with the most.

receive no special rights against the corporation and shareholders hold the rights of control).
20. Douglas Baird and Robert Rasmussen provide a recognition of this argument, at least
in times of corporate distress, and a thoughtful examination of the role of private lenders in
corporate governance. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, PrivateDebt andthe Missing
Lever of CorporateGovernance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209 (2006).
I want to be careful to point out that in this Article I am only examining the question of the
rights of public stockholders through the lens of their role in financing productivity. The role of
the stock market, as an institution, in stimulating economic growth is a much larger and more
complex question that I hope to address in a later paper as part of a larger project of which this
Article is a part. A substantial literature exists, drawing at least back to Joseph Schumpeter's
1911 work, The Theory of Economic Development, arguing that a nation's economic growth is
highly correlated with its development of sophisticated financial markets, a question of
particular interest to development economists. JOSEPH SCHUMPTER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT (Redvers Opie trans., Harvard University Press 1934) (1911). Levine provides
an excellent survey and analysis of this literature. See Levine, Financeand Growth, supranote
13, at 865-70 (explaining various studies and theories concerning the causal connection
between economic growth and aspects of financial markets); Ross Levine, Financial
Development andEconomicGrowth: Views andAgenda,35J. EcoN. LITERATURE 688,688-92
(1997) [hereinafter Levine, Views and Agenda] (arguing that financial systems are a
fundamental feature of the process for economic development). For a sample of additional
literature on the subject, see Peter L. Rousseau, Share Liquidity and IndustrialGrowth in an
Emerging Market: The Case of New England, 1854-1897, (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res.
Working Paper No. H01 17, 1999) [hereinafter Rousseau, Share Liquidity], available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/h0117.pdf (arguing that share liquidity was a key factor in the rise
of the United States as a classic case of finance-led industrialization using price indices and
returns for equities); Peter L. Rousseau & Richard Sylla, Emerging FinancialMarkets and
Early U.S. IndustrialGrowth, (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res. Working Paper No. W7448, 1999),
availableat http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfn?abstractid=191548. Gerard Caprio, Jr.
and Ash Demirguc-Kunt, in The Role ofLong-Term Finance: Theory andEvidence, 13 WORLD
BANK RES. OBSERVER 171 (1998), note that "the effect of stock market development on firms'
financing decisions is theoretically inconclusive," and little empirical evidence exists. Id. at
185; see also Ash Demirguc-Kunt & Ross Levine, Stock Market Development and Financial
Intermediaries: Stylized Facts, 10 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 291,293-94 (1996) (discussing
connections between attributes of stock markets and economic growth); Raghuram G. Rajan &
Luigi Zingales, FinancialDependence and Growth, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 559, 568-69 (1998)
(arguing that industrial sectors that are relatively more in need of finance develop
disproportionately faster in countries with more developed financial markets according to a
large sample of countries over the 1980s); Peter Haas & Gerhard Fink, The Finance-GrowthNexus Revisited: New Evidence andthe Needfor Broadeningthe Approach22 (Europainstitut:
Univ. of Econ. & Bus. Admin. Vienna, El Working Paper No. 73, 2006), available at
http://www.wu.ac.at/europainstitut/forschung/ wp73.pdf. At the same time, more recent
scholarship suggests that the data used in these studies provide only "fragile" support for the
hypothesis that finance leads growth. James B. Ang, A Survey ofRecent Developments in the
Literatureof Finance and Growth, 22 J. ECON. SURVEYS 536, 543 (2008) (noting critiques of
the finance-growth nexus argument); id. at 553 (criticizing empirical studies noting, among

other critiques, that country cross-sectional growth regressions tend to assume a positive
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Two principal exceptions exist to the conclusion that public equity does
not provide corporate investment capital. First, in recent years the financial
industry has been a net issuer of corporate equity. 21 Regulatory requirements,
and the need for an equity base to permit substantial leveraging, are the
apparent reasons for this. The second is the role of private equity in financing
risky new business and the incentives to invest that are provided by the
possibility of exit through the public market.22 While these exceptions are
important and may suggest a more layered corporate governance regime than
we have at present, they are special cases that deserve extended analysis, and so
I defer their discussion to another day.23
correlation between financial development and growth, as well as critiquing specific crosscountry regressions, time series studies, and panel studies); John Driffill, Growth and Finance,
71 MANCHESTER SCH. 363 (2003) (arguing that the empirical evidence for the finance-growth
nexus is insubstantial and that positive effects may well be due to regional differences including
those in law and culture); Felix Rioja & Neven Valev, Does One Size Fit All?: A
Reexaminationofthe Financeand Growth Relationship,74 J. DEv. ECON. 429 (suggesting the
weakness and ambiguity of empirical studies of the finance-growth nexus); Peter L. Rousseau
& Paul Wachtel, Economic Growth andFinancialDepth: Is the RelationshipExtinctAlready?
(NYU Work Paper No. 2451/26108, 2005), available at http://www.stem.nyu.edu/eco/
wkpapers/wider8.pdf (finding that the finance-growth relationship was robust using data from
the 1960s to the 1980s, but does not carry over to recent data).
21. Infra Figure 9.
22. The proportion of new business financing attributable to venture capital is quite small,
although it may be important in terms of the nature of the industries that are its primary
consumers. Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, The Economics ofSmall Business Finance:
The Roles of PrivateEquity andDebt Markets in the FinancialGrowth Cycle, 22 J. BANKING &
FIN. 613, 619-20 (1998); Paul A. Gompers, Corporationsand the Financingof Innovation:
The Corporate Venturing Experience, FED. RES. BANK ATLANTA ECON. REv., Fourth Quarter
2002, at 8-13 (showing that venture capital investment appears to be concentrated in discrete
regions of the country and discrete business sectors); Paul A. Gompers & Josh Lerner, The
Venture CapitalRevolution, 15 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 145, 157-58 (2001) (showing that in the
past there has been a disproportionate amount of funding by venture capitalists in particular
regions). Kortrum and Lemer estimate that the ratio of venture capital to research and
development (which are close substitutes in innovation) was on average 3% between 1983 and
1992, and venture capital can be attributed to 8% of innovation during that time frame. Samuel
Kortrum & Josh Lemer, Assessing the Contributionof Venture Capitalto Innovation, 31 RAND
J. ECON. 674, 675 (2000). Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny note that "[y]oung firms, and
firms with intangible assets, may need to be equity financed simply because their assets have
little or no liquidation value." Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate
Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737, 765 (1997); see also Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales,
FinancialDependence and Growth, 88 AM. ECON. REv. 559, 566-67 (1998) ("It almost goes
without saying, but is worth noting, that venture capital is highly concentrated in high
technology industries, especially information technology and, to a lesser extent,
biotechnology."). Finally, as I will later discuss, infra Part IV, venture capital tends to come in
at a stage in small business development where the innovation has substantially been developed,
although this observation says little about its utility in stimulating innovation in the first place.
23. I discuss these in Financialism,my book in progress. There appear to be some other

THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OFPUBLIC SHAREHOLDERS

1643

I begin in Part III by accepting, for purposes of discussion, a strong
argument in the development literature that holds that the stock market itself
can, as an institution, indirectly contribute to economic growth regardless of
whether shareholders provide the capital to finance production. I then argue
that, in the United States, public shareholders, acting through that market, have
increasingly (1) stripped American corporations of capital for productive
investment by a shift from investing for dividends to capital gains, and
(2) distorted managerial incentives in favor of short-term stock price increases
to the detriment of long-term productivity, such that increased shareholder
rights would
be dangerous to the real economy by aggravating already distorted
24
incentives.
exceptions. In a study covering the period from 1988 to 2004, Huang, Mayer, and Sussman find
that firms typically rely upon internal sources of financing. In the face of severe cash flow
shocks, financing turns to trade credit, inventory depletion, and cash depletion. Over time, their
pre-shock leverage ratio is restored by the issuance of new equity. Zhangkai Huang, Colin
Mayer & Oren Sussman, How Do Firms Finance Large Cash Flow Requirements? 8-10
(Oxford Fin. Res. Centre Working Paper Series, Paper No. 2008fe06, 2007), available at
http://www.finance.ox. ac.uk/filelinks/fineconpapers/2008fe06.pdf. Gilchrist, Himmelberg,
& Huberman find that equity issuances increase in response to stock price bubbles. See Simon
Gilchrist, Charles P. Himmelberg & Gur Huberman, Do Stock Price Bubbles Influence
CorporateInvestment?, 52 J. MONETARY ECON. 805, 817-24 (2005) (confirming this theory
using the empirical evidence from the 1990s NASDAQ boom); see also Malcolm Baker, Jeremy
C. Stein & Jeffrey Wurgler, When Does the Market Matter? Stock Pricesand the Investment of
Equity-Dependent Firms, 118 Q. J. ECON. 969, 972 (2003) (arguing, among other things, that
what they define as "equity-dependent firms" find investment constrained when stock prices are
low due to nonfundamental causes). Gilchrist et al. discuss some of the other literature
suggesting that the cost of external equity does have a meaningful influence on corporate
investment. None of the literature I have examined, however, maintains that, on balance, public
equity financing provides a significant proportion of industrial investment capital.
Nonetheless, economists largely are in agreement that retained earnings and debt, not
equity finance, traditionally have been the primary sources of funds for investment in productive
capital. UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR
STUDY REPORT, VOL. 1, p. 72; SuPP. VOL. I, A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC
RESEARCH ON INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CORPORATE STOCK-A BACKGROUND STUDY 37,
163 (1971) [hereinafter GOLDSMITH REPORT]; see also Levine, Views andAgenda, supra note
20, at 720 (showing that retained earnings and debt have historically been the primary sources
of funds for investment); Colin Mayer, New Issues in CorporateFinance,32 EUR. ECON. REV.
1167, 1173-74 (1988) (demonstrating that retentions and debt are the main sources of funds for
enterprises across five industrialized countries). Indeed Levine notes as a major weakness of
much of the development literature referred to earlier in this Article that "it focuses on equity
markets." Levine, Views andAgenda,supra note 20, at 714; see also Caprio & Demirguc-Kunt,
supra note 20, at 182 (criticizing Rajan and Zingales for failing to distinguish between equity
and credit markets, although noting that active, if not necessarily large, stock markets correlate
with faster growth). My central focus in this Article is on the source of funds for productive
capital, not such other growth-stimulating benefits that financial markets may provide.
24. The literature, while not yet large, suggests that a developed stock market can
introduce significant distortions in fundamental economic behavior. There is a significant and
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growing argument that such distortions do exist. See Bebchuk & Stole, supra note 9, at 725-26
(stating that short-term horizons lead to investment miscalculations by managers); Kent Daniel,
David Hirshleifer & Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, Investor Psychology and Security Market
Unde- and Overreactions,53 J. FIN. 1839, 1865 (1998) (arguing for an interpretive theory based
on investor overconfidence that shows that investors overreact to private information and
underreact to public information); James Dow & Gary Gorton, Stock Market Efficiency and
Economic Efficiency: Is There a Connection?, 52 J. FIN. 1087, 1115-16 (1997) (accepting the
idea that stock prices guide managerial behavior but with a more optimistic view of the results,
at least assuming market efficiency); Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 22, at 772 (noting that a
"large theoretical and anecdotal literature argues that the American corporate governance
system, particularly takeovers, imposes short horizons on the behavior of corporate managers,
and hence reduces the efficiency of investment"); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny,
Equilibrium Short Horizons of Investors and Firms, 80 AM. ECON. ASS'N PAPERS &
PROCEEDINGS 148, 151-53 (1990) (arguing that short terming by arbitrageurs leads to short
terming by firms and becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy); Jeremy C. Stein, Agency, Information
and Corporate Investment, in HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 109, 120 (G.M.
Constantinidies, M. Harris & R. Stultz eds., 2003) (surveying the literature); Jeremy C. Stein,
Efficient CapitalMarkets, Inefficient Firms: A Model ofMyopic CorporateBehavior,104 Q. J.
ECON. 655, 668 (1989) (arguing that looking at the short-run causes myopic corporate behavior
that "can be viewed as the Nash equilibrium outcome of a noncooperative game between
managers and the stock market"); Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats and ManagerialMyopia,
96 J. POL. ECON. 61, 74-78 (1988) (discussing the literature pertaining to manager myopia and
how takeover behavior influences firms and investors). More recent empirical work seems to
provide some confirmation of the theoretical insight. See generally John R. Graham, Campbell
R. Harvey & Shivaram Rajgopal, The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial
Reporting, 40 J. AcCT. & ECON. 3 (2005) (studying the factors that affect managers' decisions);
John R. Graham, Campbell R. Harvey & Shiva Rajgopal, Value Destruction and Financial
ReportingDecisions, 62 FIN. ANALYSIS J. 27 (2006) (studying how executives make decisions
based on performance measurement and voluntary disclosure); Alfred Rappaport, The
Economics ofShort-Term Performance Obsession,61 FIN. ANALYSIS J. 65, 77 (2005) (arguing
that "there is no greater impediment to good corporate governance and long-term value creation
than earnings obsession"); Philippe Aghion & Jeremy C. Stein, Growth vs. Margins:
DestabilizingConsequences of Giving the Stock Market What it Wants 24-25 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 10999, 2004) (arguing that "the desire to please the stock
market can introduce significant excess volatility into real variables even if the market is fully
efficient"), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w10999.pdf?newwindow=l; see also
sources cited at Levine, Financeand Growth, supra note 13, at 874; sources cited supra note
14.
A more skeptical approach to this view exists, at least for larger firms. See Randall Morck
et al., The Stock Market andInvestment: Is the Market a Sideshow?, 1990 BROOKINGS PAPERS
ECON. Acrvrry 157, 199 (1990) (arguing that the stock market has little explanatory power);
see also Malcolm Baker et al., When Does the Market Matter? Stock Pricesandthe Investment
of Equity-DependentFirms, 118 Q. J. ECON. 969, 996-97 (2003) (arguing, among other things,
that what they define as "equity-dependent firms" find investment constrained when stock prices
are low due to nonfimdamental causes); Kenneth A. Froot, Andre Perold & Jeremy C. Stein,
ShareholderTradingPracticesand CorporateInvestment Horizons, 5 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 42,
200 (1992) (finding that the net effect on stock volatility from more disclosure is zero for firms).
Gilchrist et al. discuss some of the other literature suggesting that the cost of external equity
does have a meaningful influence on corporate investment. Gilchrist et al., supra note 23, at
808-10. It is worth noting that much of this literature was published before the bubble decade
of the 1990s took place and the substantial increase in stock market volatility and buyback
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My method is to critique two common arguments that, on close
examination, suggest ways that the actions of public shareholders can damage
the real economy. The first, perhaps the dominant argument in favor of
shareholder voting, holds that shareholder voting is efficient because
shareholders are specialists in risk bearing. I argue that the flaw in this
argument is that the only risks in which shareholders are specialists are those
that they themselves create. Thus, shareholder voting cannot be efficient, at
least as far as improved corporate productivity is concerned, because the
interests of shareholders that are derived from these risks are largely irrelevant
to corporate production.
This leads logically to the second and, perhaps, more interesting question
of the manner in which dramatic changes in styles of investment have created a
body of public shareholders whose profit expectations lead them effectively to
pressure managers to steal from the corporate present in order to allow them to
reap potentially illusory profits from the corporate future.25 Shareholder
pressure creates incentives for managers to spend corporate cash now to create
the illusion of future wealth and thus enhance stock prices rather than to invest
in the long-term health of the corporation. A growing body of literature from
the early 1990s on explores this question, with mixed results, but with most
scholars tending to find that the public stock market does have noticeable
affects on managerial incentives.2 6 This gives rise to the further implication
that significant restraints should be put on market behavior through the creation
of incentives that favor long-term investing over short-term speculation.27
activity during the beginning of the twenty-first century.
25. See MITCHELL, CoRPoRATE IRRESPONSIBILITY, supranote 9, at 133-34 (arguing that
quarterly reporting is hazardous because speculator shareholders constantly seek short-term
benefits instead of letting long-term goals mature). The very considerable difference between
the expectation of profits from dividends and that from stock price increases, as I will discuss in
Part III, seems very much to be the difference between investing and gambling. The difference
would be erased in either the case of an efficient stock market, which is by no means any longer
an article of faith, or if capital gains reflected only the accumulation of retained earnings. As I
will show, the behavior of the stock market over the last fifty years eliminates the latter
possibility.
26. See supranote 24 and accompanying text (discussing literature and research dealing
with the causal connection between managerial decisions and stock market incentives).
27. History shows that direct attempts to regulate, or even to define, speculation typically
fail. MiTCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY, supra note 11, at 188-91. My suggestions are
more indirect and are aimed at building financial incentives into market decisionmaking for
long-term holding. See MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY, supra note 9, at 276-78
(summarizing my suggestions for improving long-term corporate management). I will not
repeat these suggestions here. Rather, I believe that the limitations on shareholder rights that I
advocate will help to relieve short-term pressures from management in a similar, indirect
manner.
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Part IV concludes with a re-evaluation of the legitimate rights of public
shareholders in light of their actual role in the American economy. They are
few, indeed. At the very least, in the absence of any evidence that public
shareholders serve American industry in a positive way, there is no credible
case for the extension of shareholder rights.
II. Financiers Who Do Not Finance: The EmpiricalEvidence
In order to be legitimate, the rights of public shareholders must be
grounded in reality, in some net social or private benefit conferred by public
shareholders. The principal justification in the legal and financial economics
literature for the existence of public shareholders is that they provide financing
for risky enterprise.28 But it is clear that, on balance, the American public stock
28. Rajan & Zingales, supra note 22, at 559. An additional justification for the market,
beyond the scope of this Article, is its role in providing an exit for those who finance risky
enterprise. See Levine, Financeand Growth, supra note 13, at 875-76 (explaining literature
that argues that systems that allow agents to hold a diversified portfolio on risky projects fosters
a reallocation of savings toward high-return ventures with positive repercussions on growth);
Levine, Views and Agenda, supra note 20, at 693 (arguing that liquid stock markets reduce
liquidity risks and drive transaction costs down, so more investment occurs in illiquid, highreturn projects). Furtherjustifications include that the market helps to ameliorate informational
asymmetries, assists corporate monitoring, facilitates price discovery, and helps to encourage
economic development. Id. at 690-93. Most of the market's identified functions either help to
support, or are consequences of, the two principal functions noted in the text. Id. at 691.
The private equity boom, which, in one form or another, gained momentum from the 1980s
until the recent market collapse, has raised a number of questions ranging from the efficiency of
transactions to, most recently and dominantly, the financial success of private equity funds. See
generally Levine, Financeand Growth,supranote 13, at 874 (discussing literature dealing with
transactions, markets, and growth). It has also led to questions about the need for, and
desirability of, public equity financing in the large, modem corporation, the touchstone being
Michael Jensen's now-famous 1989 HarvardBusiness Review article, The Eclipse of the Public
Corporation. See Michael Jensen, The Eclipse of the Public Corporation,HARv. Bus. REv.,
Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 61 (arguing that the publicly held corporation has outlived its usefulness in
many sectors of the economy). Ron Gilson and Charles Whitehead have, over the past several
years, been revisiting and revising Jensen's argument. See Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K.
Whitehead, DeconstructingEquity: Public Ownership, Agency Costs, and Complete Capital
Markets, 108 COLuM. L. REv. 231, 233 (2008) (recalling "Michael Jensen's then premature
announcement, of the 'eclipse of the public corporation' by a more efficient organization
form"). The implications of this Article suggest that Jensen was more or less on time, just as
Thorstein Veblen predicted the growth of a banker-dominated stock market economy in its
earliest stages. MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY, supra note 11, at 13-14.
In this Article I disregard as irrelevant to the broader story the historic stock market crash
that followed a Congressional bailout of the mortgage-backed securities industry during late
September and early October of the Panic of 2008. David M. Herszenhom & Carl Hulse,
Breakthrough Reached in Negotiations on Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2008, at Al
(explaining the crash of 2008 and the ensuing bailout bill). Indeed while the consequences of
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market rarely has been a significant factor in financing industrial enterprise. 29
The only American business sector to rely upon public stock issuances as an
important source of financing productive activity, and that only relatively
recently, is the financial industry itself. What are the legitimate rights of public
shareholders if they do not play a role in financing production?
In Part II.A, I explain the history of public equity financing in America,
which is a relatively recent phenomenon. In Part II.B, I present the empirical
evidence. That evidence, compiled from raw IRS corporate balance sheet data
going back to 1955,30 Federal Flow of Funds data, compilations of earlier data
where raw data were unavailable, 31 and other secondary sources identified
where relevant,3 2 clearly demonstrates that, on average, external equity has
the ongoing financial crisis might ultimately affect my (and others') analysis, I believe it is too
early to say anything meaningful about the future effects of the Panic. Consequently, my
analysis and data run through early 2007, treating the beginning of the Panic as, at the latest, the
summer of 2007.
29. Part of the explanation for the commonly held view that external equity is an
important source of funding, comes from the discipline's reliance on financial economics, which
"has not emphasized real capital" in contrast to stock market capital. See Robert E. Hall, The
Stock Market and CapitalAccumulation, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1185, 1194 (2001) (stating that
pure valuation errors create measurement errors in both quantity and price of capital in his
framework).
30. These data were obtained as a result of my Freedom of Information Act request. Data
from 1961 and 1977 were unavailable, but the effect of this absence is insignificant. I am
indebted to Bill Bratton for the observation that balance sheets prepared for tax purposes might
show lower retained earnings than balance sheets prepared for Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP) purposes. While any difference should have no effect on the overall trends,
it might affect the absolute numbers. I also note that I have not included depreciation
allowances as a contribution to internal cash flow. This omission understates internal financing
and I will correct it in future work.
31. These data are drawn largely from records compiled by the United States Internal
Revenue Service, the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the United States Bureau of the Census) as
compiled in the various StatisticalAbstractsof the UnitedStates, and the historical abstracts of
the United States, primarily as compiled and analyzed in the HistoricalStatistics of the United
States: MillennialEdition.
32. See generally GOLDSMrrI REPORT, supra note 23; SIMON KuzNETS, CAPITAL INTHE
AMERICAN ECONOMY: ITS FORMATION AND FINANCING (1961) (providing supplemental data on
long-term trends in capital formation and financing in the United States). See also generally
Richard Sutch, NationalIncome andProduct,in HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES:
MILLENtAL EDITION, VOLUME 3: ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE (Susan B. Carter et
al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter MILLENNIAL STATISTICS] (evaluating different empirical studies of
capital formation in the United States). The relationship between capital formation and
transactions costs is also highly complex. See, e.g., John Joseph Wallis & Douglass C. North,
Measuring the Transaction Sector in the American Economy, 1870-1970, in LONG-TERM
FACTORS IN AMERICAN GROWTH 95,96-104 (Stanley L. Engerman & Robert E. Gallman eds.,
1986) (incorporating the notion of the transaction sector into the structure of national income
and product accounts).
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rarely been an important source of finance for American industry, and that American
public shareholders have withdrawn more equity from corporations than they have
contributed to their financing.33 Indeed, external equity financing for American
industry only began to grow from the turn of the twentieth century on, and the lion's
share of external financing was in various forms of debt. 4 The data show relatively
flat or very slightly positive to net negative issuances of capital stock, even during such
active trading periods as the 1960s Go-Go years and the internet bubble of the late
1990s.35 Capital stock is so relatively unimportant as a financing source for the

formation of productive industrial capital that recent years have seen corporate stock
repurchases outstrip almost all other forms of corporate investment; including, for the
three years ending September
30, 2007, investment in capital for the production of
36
services.
and
goods

33. Economists writing in the 1950s and early 1960s, when good data first became
available, widely support the conclusion that the public stock market is relatively unimportant to
industrial finance. See GOLDSMIT REPORT, supra note 23; KUZNETS, supra note 32, at 253
(showing the total, internal, and external financing of large manufacturing corporations from
1900 to 1953); Jules I. Bogen, The ImportanceofEquity Financingin the American Economy,
5 J. FIN. 170, 173 (1950) (arguing that there was a shift from the main source of equity financing
from sale of new stock to retention of earnings); S.P. Dobrovolsky, Economics of Corporate
Internaland External Financing,13 J. FIN. 35, 35 (1958) (stating that American corporations
have generally been characterized by a high degree of dependence on retention of funds from
revenue stream instead of external financing); John Lintner, The Financingof Corporations,in
THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 166, 166-67 (Edward S. Mason ed., .1960); Mayer,
supra note 23, at 1173-74; Arnold W. Sametz, Trends in the Volume and Composition of
Equity Finance,19 J. FIN. 450,450 (1964) (stating that it is well known that since World War II
internal equity finance provided a huge portion of the funds, while external equity finance has
played a relatively minor role).
34. See infra notes 37-47 and accompanying text (explaining the growth of equity in
America and noting the exception of debt issued primarily by railroads, which grew in the late
nineteenth century).
35. See infra Figures 7-9 (showing patterns in issuance of stock).
36. See infra Figures 7-9 and accompanying text (displaying formation of productive
capital and stock repurchase patterns). It is also important to emphasize the distinction between
external equity, raised through the sale of publicly issued securities, and internal forms of
equity, including retained earnings, depreciation and depletion allowances, and the use of
current expenses to fund the creation of capital assets through, for example, research and
development. See Bogen, supra note 33, at 171 (defining different ways owners of equity can
provide capital). While there is a superficially appealing argument that these internal forms of
equity financing ought to be attributed to public stockholders who, after all, depend upon them
for their ultimate return of capital, I shall be at pains to argue that, because equity financing is so
minor a portion of corporate finance-indeed Bogen notes it constituted 5% of invested funds in
the period 1946-1948--one cannot attribute the creation of those funds to the investment of
outside equity so much as to various forms of debt financing. Id. at 172. The implication is
that, while the law grants the residual of these funds to shareholders, it does so at the expense of
other, far more important, sources of corporate finance.
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A. A (Very) BriefHistory ofEquity Financingin America
A significant public equity market, at least for industrial concerns, is just a bit
over 100 years old, created at a point where industrialization had reached a stage of
reasonable maturity. 7 The railroads were financed largely with government subsidies

and debt,38 and industrial corporations from Standard Oil to the companies that
combined to create U.S. Steel were financed with retained earnings and debt.39 The
public equity market simply was not an important factor. 40
37. Rousseau identifies fifty-one industrial companies listed on the Boston Stock
Exchange in 1897. Rousseau, Share Liquidity,supra note 20, at 2-17. This was more or less
the peak of that exchange's leadership before becoming overshadowed by the New York Stock
Exchange. Id. at 4; see JOHN MOODY, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TRusTs 110 (1904) (noting that
the Pullman Palace Car Company was the only industrial company trading on the New York
Stock Exchange in the 1880s). Even the largest of these were small companies. See Thomas R.
Navin & Marian V. Sears, The Rise of a Marketfor IndustrialSecurities, 1877-1902,29 Bus.
HIST. REV. 105, 110 (1955) (explaining the common unit of organization was small). Navin and
Sears further note that in 1890 only ten industrials had their prices quoted in financial journals,
rising to thirty by 1893 and 170 by the beginning of the merger wave in 1897. Id. at 110, 127.
38. See GABRIEL KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION: 1877-1916, at 15 (1965) ("[Tlhe
railroads during the 1870's were the products, in large measure, of the financial efforts of the
state and federal governments-about $350 million in state and federal funds, plus many
millions of acres in land-grants, were pumped into the canal and railroad system until 1873.");
Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., PatternsofAmerican RailroadFinance,28 Bus. HIST. REV. 248,248-

49 (1954) (describing railroads' use of bonds); see also ARTHUR T. HADLEY, RAILROAD
TRANSPORTATION: ITS HISTORY AND ITS LAWS 51-52, 53-62 (1907) (describing the use of
bonds in order to finance new projects). It is interesting to note that Hadley uses "stock" to
include debentures and bonds, but it becomes clear from his discussion of railroad accounting
(and attendant fraud) that debt was the primary instrument of railroad finance in the nineteenth
century. Id. at 52. Ripley describes a detailed and nuanced evolution of railroad financing,
noting that prior to the mid-I 850s railroads principally capitalized with stock, but that following
the Civil War bonds became the principal means of railroad finance. It is well-known that much
of the private funding for railroad construction and expansion came from Europe, and "all
European capital for railroad purposes came to this country in the form of mortgage loans."
WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, RALROADS: FINANCE AND ORGANIZATION 104-10 (1923); see also ALFRED
D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS
91-172 (1977) (describing the formation of the railroad corporations and their financing
structures). Cf. Peter Tufano, Business Failure, Judicial Intervention, and Financial
Innovation: RestructuringU.S. Railroads in the Nineteenth Century, 71 Bus. HIST. REV. 1, 637 (1997) (describing the judicial innovations that restricted railroads and provided new
regulations for securities).
39. See S.P. Dobrovolsky, Economics of CorporateInternaland ExternalFinancing,13
J. FIN. 35, 35 (1958) (stating that American corporations have been characterized by a high
degree of dependence on the internal method of financing).
40. See Navin & Sears, supra note 37, at 106 (stating that before 1890, people with excess
capital had very little choice in securities and there was no significant market for equity);
MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY,

supra note 11, at 9 (stating that in the nineteenth

century most corporations were owned by founders and their families with only a small amount
of stock available from railroads).
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Thus, American industrialization was accomplished with little significant
external equity capital and, in the case of industrial corporations (in contrast to
railroads, banks, and insurance companies), such external equity capital that was raised
was almost always raised privately. 41 Naomi Lamoreaux notes that equity capital was
rarely a source of permanent finance before the 1930S.42 Railroads financed largely
through debt 43 principally because limited disclosure discouraged outside
shareholders and the more transparent integrity of some bond houses allowed lenders
to rely upon the reputation of the selling bank for repayment.44 Significant trading in
railroad stock typically signified a battle for control.45 While banks and utilities did
finance with equity, it was typically confined to local holders.46 Virtuallyno industrial
companies issued
public equity and some, like Carnegie Steel, were organized as
47
partnerships.

The merger wave of 1897 to 1903 generally is identified as the period during
which the giant modem public corporation was created.48 While there is little question
41. Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Business Organization,in MILLENNIAL STATISTICS, supranote
32, at 3-477, 3-486 (explaining that most corporations before the 1930s only had a few
individuals that held stock except for the railroads, which had people along the routes holding
equity); Navin & Sears, supra note 37, at 106 (explaining that corporations before 1930 did not
use publicly sold equity to finance ventures); CHANDLER, supra note 38, at 90-92 (stating that
railroads were the only major corporations using public financing prior to the 1930s, but usually
the financiers consisted of a small group of individuals).
42. See Lamoreaux, supra note 41, at 3-486 (describing the lack of public equity markets
before the 1930s).
43. See HADLEY, supra note 38, at 50-62 (discussing the significant role of bonds and
other forms of credit in financing the railroads).
44. See Lamoreaux, supra note 41, at 3-486 (describing the problems of asymmetric
information).
45. See id.
(explaining the merger wave that created large corporations); MITCHELL, THE
SPECULATION ECONOMY, supra note 11, at 11 ("When railroad stock was traded in any great
volume, it almost always meant that different factions were clawing for control or speculators
were toying with the stock."). Railroad finance also was a significant source of financial fraud
that principally affected shareholders. See RIPLEY, supra note 38, at 35 (discussing the device
of the railroad construction company and its use in siphoning railroad capital to controlling
shareholders).
46. See Lamoreaux, supra note 41, at 3-486 (stating that most equity holders were either a
small group of related investors or those people that lived along the railroad).
47. See Navin & Sears, supra note 37, at 106-10 (describing ownership in the 1880s and
stating that Carnegie Steel was a series of partnerships).
48. See NAOMI LAMOREAUX, THE GREAT MERGER MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN BUSINESS,
1895-1904, at 191-94 (1985) (stating that the wave of mergers gave rise to large horizontally
integrated corporations until regulation forced an end to the horizontal spread and gave rise to
vertically integrated corporations); MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY, supranote 11, at
11-12 (stating that the merger wave created the large modem corporation by creating stock);
Navin & Sears, supra note 37, at 136-37. See generally JoHN MOODY, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE
TRUSrS (1904) (offering a sometimes detailed picture of the corporate components and
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that this is the time during which large numbers of industrial corporations went public,
the function of public equity during this period was not especially related to
financing.49 Although data is most unreliable before the passage of the Sixteenth
Amendment and the enactment of the federal income tax in 1913, it seems clear that
equity securities during this period were not so much used to raise corporate capital as
to provide a currency for corporate acquisitions. ° Legal changes, most prominently in
New Jersey, effectively licensed corporate promoters to print stock for the purpose of
assembling competing companies into larger horizontal conglomerates.51
2
While stock offerings in the new combinations did raise some working capital,1
their primary purpose was to provide liquidity to industrialists and their families and
profits to their investment bankers who took substantial portions of their fees in
stocL.53 This is not to say that securities offerings during the merger wave failed to
fulfill a business purpose. To the extent that corporate combination rationalized
business and eliminated destructive competition, common stock provided a cash-free
way to ensure business survival and eliminate duplicative costs. 4 The opportunity to
use this method was provided by an unusually large cash surplus in the American
economy and a paucity of investment opportunities available to the newly emerging
middle class." So common stock may have played a useful role in corporate
restructuring, but not in financing production, and it is hardly clear from the historical
56
record that it was a role that could not have been played with equal success by debt.
capitalizations of the newly public corporations emerging from the merger wave as well as
aggregate data on the combinations).
49. Navin & Sears, supra note 37, at 136-37.
50. MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY, supra note 11.
51. See id. at 121-23 (explaining the history of mergers that occurred primarily in New
Jersey).
52. See Luther Conant, Jr., Industrial Consolidations in the United States, 53
PUBLICATIONS OF THE AM. STAT. ASS'N 1, 2-11 (1901) (providing data on capitalization of
various corporations).
53. Rousseau, Share Liquidity, supra note 20, at 5 n.6.
54. See LAMOREAuX, supranote 48, at 187-94 (arguing that although the consolidation of
corporations was not inevitable, it was a rational solution to the problems of competition and
illiquidity that the corporations faced). The extent to which the combinations formed during the
merger wave actually succeeded remains a subject of debate among business historians. It also
bears noting that the new combinations did issue equity to raise some working capital during the
merger wave. MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY, supra note 11, at ch. I.
55. See Lamoreaux, supra note 41, at 3-486 (explaining that common stock provided an
avenue for investment for American middle class savers after World War II).
56. J.P. Morgan began the practice of using common stock in railroad reorganizations
instead of the more common debt in order to eliminate fixed charges from railroad balance
sheets. See id. (explaining how Morgan used his reputation for financial probity to build a
market for railroads' stocks). Lamoreaux also makes the case that the elimination of high fixed
charges in competitive industrial markets with low product differentiation was a principal
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The success of the restructuring that did occur also remains a subject of
lively debate among business historians.
The unavoidable conclusion appears to be that American corporations
achieved high productivity without significant funding from public
equity. 57 This certainly was the case for most of the nineteenth century,
when some of America's largest (and still extant) corporations grew to
maturity, and when American industrialization had completed its formative
phase. 58 As I will now demonstrate, it continued to be true for most of the
financial motivator ofthe merger wave. See LAMOREAUX, supranote 48, at 12 (arguing that the
rapid expansion of capital intensive industries followed by depression caused abnormally
serious price wars that led to the merger wave). This might suggest that debt financing would
not have been a workable alternative to facilitate corporate combination. But the merger wave
occurred during a time when dividend payments, although they remained discretionary with
boards of directors, were expected by shareholders and only the desperate corporation could
afford to pass a dividend. See MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY, supranote 11, at 95
(explaining how shareholder power creates harmful incentives). During the first decade of the
century (encompassing the last four years of the merger wave), Cowles Commission/Standard &
Poor's ("S&P") Composite stock dividend yields exceeded corporate bond yields by a mean of
30%, although with a standard deviation of 1.2 for stock yields compared with a standard
deviation of.52 for bond yields. See Peter L. Rousseau, Stock Dividend Yields: 1802-1999, in
MiLLENNIAL STATISTICS, supra note 32, tbl.Cj808-816 (providing the stock yields); SIDNEY
HOMER & RICHARD SYLLA, A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES 342 tbl.45 (3d ed. 1996) (providing
the bond yields). The median difference was 28%. Id. Investors in the new stock issues clearly
anticipated compensatory returns for their risk in the form of dividends. So, while the flexibility
to pass dividends might have made common stock appear more attractive to issuers, the
financial reality was that it was little different from debt in terms of corporate obligation, and
debt financing might have been a workable alternative. In addition, debt's requirement of fixed
charges might have prevented the overcapitalization that destabilized financial markets before
the creation of the Federal Reserve Board (and for some time after, until it had gained real
power) and limited corporate combinations to those more likely to be economically sustainable
on the basis of real productivity.
57. Navin & Sears, supra note 37, at 106 (showing the rise of corporations without a
significant market for equity); MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY, supra note 11, at 9.
58. Thomas McCraw identifies the founding periods of several of America's largest
corporations well before the merger wave (although a few, like General Electric, were the product of
corporate combination), including Eastman Kodak, Chiquita Brands, Johnson & Johnson, Coca-Cola,
Westinghouse Electric, Sears Roebuck, Avon Products, Hershey Foods (the 1880s), General Electric,
Knight-Ridder, Ralston Purina, Reebok International, Harris Corp., PepsiCo, and Goodyear (the
1890s). See Thomas K. McCraw, American Capitalism,in CREATING MODERN CAPrrAuSM: How
ENTREPRENEURS, COMPANIES, AND COUNTRIES TRuMPHED INTHREE INDUSTRIAL REVOUnONS 303,
321 (Thomas K. McCraw ed., 2000) (listing Fortune 500 companies by founding dates). Of course
many extremely large companies predated or were formed parallel to these, including Standard Oil,
Carnegie Steel, Armour & Co., Proctor & Gamble, McCormick Reaper and John Deere (which would
combine into International Harvester), and American Sugar Refining. Id. McCraw is careful to
emphasize that these peniods do not necessarily cover the corporations' eras of greatest growth, but it is
fair to say that, taken together, they illustrate the very substantial extent to which America had
industrialized well before the advent of the public industrial corporation. See id at 321 ("The decades
listed are those ofthe companies' founding, not necessarily when they became large.").
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twentieth century, most reliably (in terms of available data) at least from
World War If onward.5 9
B. The EmpiricalEvidence
The earliest data I present is drawn from work compiled for the Bureau of
Economic Analysis by Simon Kuznets through 1956 and extended to 1962 by Arnold
Sametz and presented in Table 1.60 These data show that, for the first half of the
twentieth century, overall external financing (including debt) was less important than
internal sources of finance in general, and that its importance declined significantly in
the post-World War II years. 61 Using long-term cycles rather than individual years for
a variety of methodological reasons, Kuznets shows that internal sources of finance
were as follows through 1956, and Sametz, using different sources, shows this
continuing until 1962.
Table 1: Ratios of Internal to Total Sources of Funds Nonfinancial Corporations
1901-195662
Years

Ratio

1901-1912

0.55

1913-1922
1923-1929
1930-1933
1934-1939
1940-1945
1946-1949
1946-1956
1957-1962

0.60
0.55
0.98
0.80
0.64
0.61
0.61

The data original to this paper, presented in a time series running from 1955
through 2006, has been drawn and compiled from raw IRS balance sheet

59. See Bogen, supra note 33, at 171-76 (showing statistical evidence); KUzNETS,supra
note 32, at 253 (displaying the total, internal, and external financing for large manufacturing
corporations); Sametz, supranote 33, at 453-59 (providing numerous tables displaying internal
and external financing data).
60. KuzNETS, supra note 32, at 245-49 (providing tables giving long-term patterns in
sources of corporation financing); Sametz, supranote 33, at 453-59 (providing numerous tables
displaying internal and external financing data).
61. KUZNETS, supranote 32, at 245-49; Sametz, supra note 33, at 453-59.
62. KUZNETS, supra note 32, at 248 tbl.39; Sametz, supra note 33, at 455.
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compilations.63 What those data demonstrate is that until the 1970s, American
corporations financed their productive activities almost exclusively through retained
earnings and various forms of debt.64 From the late 1970s on, retained earnings
began rapidly to disappear, to be replaced almost entirely by debt. Public stock
issuances rarely were a factor in industrial production.
Figures 1 through 5 show that the predominance ofinternal financing begins to
decline in the mid- 1950s, and rapidly thereafter from the 1980s into the twenty-first
century.65 As I will soon clarify, its diminution has not been balanced by a net
increase
in external equity, but rather by a dramatic increase in off-balance sheet
66
debt.
Figure 1 is the ratio of retained earnings to external financing. 67 Retained
earnings are, effectively, corporate savings, available either for investment in
productive activity or, in some circumstances, payments to shareholders.6 8 Figure 1
shows a dramatic decline in the proportion of corporate assets attributable to
retained earnings, and thus the amount of corporate savings.69

63.

SOI BULLETIN HISTORICAL TABLES AND APPENDIX, TABLE 13-CoRPoRATIoN INCOME

TAX RETURNS:

BALANCE SHEET, INCOME STATEMENT, AND TAX ITEMS FOR INCOME YEARS,

1990-2005, http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=175846,00.html [hereinafter SO BULLETIN
HISTORICAL TABLES] (last visited Sept. 1, 2009) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). We drew all other data from various volumes of the Statistics of Income (SOI)
Bulletin, issued quarterly, by the Statistics of Income Division of the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS), and made available to us at the IRS library pursuant to Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) Request. We have compiled our data from 1938 but do not here present the earlier
results due to the fact that the IRS records separate paid-in or capital surplus only from 1955.
64. The ratios of external to internal financing are based on the following equation:
External Financing = (Capital Stock) + (Paid in Capital or Capital Surplus) + (Accounts
Payable) + (Short-Term Debt) + (Long-Term Debt).
65. Infra Figures 1-5.
66. Infra notes 67-74 and accompanying text. The data contained in these figures are
also presented in tabular form in Appendix A.
67. Infra Figure 1.
68. Retained earnings do not, of course, necessarily represent cash, but rather the net
value of corporate assets not represented by the capital balance sheet entries shown in Figure 2.
Retained earnings can be distributed to shareholders as returns of equity in the form of
dividends and stock buybacks.
69. Infra Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Ratio of Retained Earnings to External Financing
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Figure 2 captures the ratio of capital plus paid-in capital or capital surplus
to external financing. This data serves as a proxy for both public and private
equity issuances in general. I present a set of equity data based on net issuance
values in Figures 7 through 9.70 These balance sheet items, together with the
retained earnings shown in Figure 1, constitute the equity portion of a corporate
balance sheet. While the data show a steady rise in capital as a proportion of
external financing from 1979 to 2002, the aggregate data presented in this
paper suggest that the uptrend is at least in part attributable to an apparent
decline of all other forms of financing rather than an actual increase in equity
itself.7

70. Infra Figures 7-9.
71. In other words, if one were to hold capital relatively constant and decrease all other
forms of external financing, one would expect to see the ratio of capital to external financing
rise simply as a mathematical matter. See infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text (concluding
that the likely growth in external financing comes in the form of off-balance sheet debt). Fama
& French, supranote 18, at 574-75. Finally, as I show in Figure 9, financial corporations have
been net issuers of equity in recent years and some of the uptrend is undoubtedly attributable to
their financing. Infra Figure 9. Financial corporations are included in the IRS data.
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Figure 2: Ratio of Capital Plus Paid-in Capital or Capital Surplus
to External Financing

0.60
050

..

. . . . . . .

.

. .

Figures 3 through 5 capture the ratios of the various components of debt
(accounts payable, short-term debt, and long-term debt) to external financing.
Accounts payable increase rather significantly, but both short-term and longterm debt show substantial declines after initially rising through the late 1980s
(short-term debt) and the early-1970s (long-term debt).
Figure 3: Ratio of Accounts Payable to External Financing
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Figure 4: Ratio of Short-Term Debt to External Financing
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Figure 5: Ratio of Long-Term Debt to External Financing
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Mapped together, the trends appear in Figure 6 as follows:
Figure 6: Ratio of Retained Earnings and Other Debt to External Financing

"Rab ofAof Pay~I WEft-I,Fhon&g
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-oRio
ofLongTon Dertto Eo t t Ftnnotg

In place of the Kuznets-Sametz first half century range of retained
earnings of 55% to 71% (leaving aside the extraordinary 98% during the period
when America was emerging from the Great Depression), we see 37% in 1978,
dropping as low as 3% in 2002 (which can partially be explained by the
consequences of September 11, 2001), but still well below 20% from 1986 on.
Clearly, the importance of retained earnings in relation to overall external
financing has evaporated and, as the graphs show, this also appears to be true of
the various forms of debt, although accounts payable show some degree of
72
relative stability.
Perhaps the most striking thing about these data, besides their departure
from historical trends, is that they are entirely counterintuitive. For what we
see is that, almost precisely when the going-private movement began in the late
1970s, in the form of leveraged transactions in which it has principally
continued,73 the relative importance of retained earnings and all forms of debt
72. See supra Figure 6 (illustrating the relationship between retained earnings and
external financing).
73. See M. Todd Henderson & Richard A. Epstein, The Going-PrivatePhenomenon:
Causes andImplications,76 U. C. L. REv. 1, 1-5 (2009) (discussing the origins of the goingprivate phenomenon in America in the 1970s).
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plummet and equity appears to rise. 74 In light of the fact that going-private
transactions, by definition, remove equity from the public market, and the
common understanding that debt financing was the principal means of
accomplishing this, we would expect to see exactly the opposite result, even
accounting for the dot-com boom of the late 1990s. The diminution in the ratio
of retained earnings to external financing by itself is not especially surprising,
although the magnitude is, because one characteristic of attractive takeover
targets is large amounts of cash with which to pay debt service, and one might
conclude that leveraged going-private transactions eat internal equity and
continue to eat cash flows that might add to that equity. But the debt numbers
are surprising in light of what we know about financing during the period. The
surprise is compounded when we recognize also that the mid-1990s to 2007
were a time of historically low interest rates, which would also suggest that debt
financing would have become increasingly attractive as a matter of financing
productivity.
The probable answer is that some very significant portion of this
diminution in debt is accounted for by off-balance sheet financing transactions,
although for obvious reasons data on off-balance sheet financing are
notoriously difficult to compile.75 Although perhaps an extreme case, had
74. See SOI BULLETIN HISTORICAL TABLES, supra note 63 (providing the data used in
Figure 6 and accompanying text). But see supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text
(discussing probable explanations for the apparent increase in equity).
75. Off-balance sheet financing began to gain currency in the 1980s. A.L Hartgraves &
George J. Branson, The Evolving Accounting Standardsfor Special PurposeConsolidations,16
AccT. HORIZONS 245,246-58 (2002) (discussing the increase in off-balance sheet financing in
the late 1970s and early 1980s as a way to help banks and companies monetize); FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD,STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No.125
(June 1996).
Leasing, research and development, and limited partnerships accounted for the principal
uses of off-balance sheet financing prior to the development of special purpose entities in the
1990s. As long ago as 1994, "industry statistics show that leased equipment represented nearly
one-third, or $140 billion, of the capital equipment used by businesses in the country .... "
Joanne C. Duke et al., FirmSpecific Determinantsof Off-Balance Sheet Leasing: A Test ofthe
Smith/Wakeman Model, 8 J. Bus. MGMT. 335, 336 (2004); see also Lillian F. Mills & Kaye J.
Newberry, Firms' Off-BalanceSheet andHybridDebtFinancing: Evidencefrom Their BookTax Reporting Differences, 43 J. ACCT. RES. 251, 251-52 (2005) ("Firms' off-balance sheet
financing arrangements can take multiple forms including R&D limited partnerships, lease
transactions, and securitizations."); Paul B.W. Miller & Paul R. Bahnson, Off-Balance Sheet
Financing? Holy Grail or Holey Pail?, ACCT. TODAY, Feb. 11, 2008, at 13 (providing a
critique and explanation of the extent of off-balance sheet financing).
Research and development limited partnerships (RDLPs) may have different effects than
other forms of off-balance sheet financing. See, e.g., Thomas M. Carment, Hamid Pourjalali &
David Durkee, A MotivationalStudy of Off-Balance Sheet Financing: The Case of Research
andDevelopment Limited Partnerships,37 MiD-ATLANTIC J. Bus. 153, 168-69 (2001) ("Off-
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Enron reported its off-balance sheet financing as balance sheet debt in 2000, its
reported debt would have been $22.1 billion instead of its actual reported
balance sheet debt of $10.2 billion. 6 Perhaps more strikingly, one estimate
notes that in 2003, $208 billion, or 31% of a total of $668 billion of productive
business assets, were acquired by off-balance sheet leasing. 77 It seems
reasonable to conclude that off-balance sheet financing arrangements account
for a substantial proportion of the apparent diminution in long-term debt, a
practice which, intentionally or not, distorts corporate balance sheets and drives
stock prices higher.78
An examination of Federal Flow of Funds data makes the trend even more
puzzling. As shown in Figure 7, from 1945, except for a brief period between
1991 and 1993, and another between 2000 and 2003, net equity issuances by
all corporations have been flat or negative, and in fact a significant dip occurred
between 1996 and 1998 during the dot-con boom.79
balance sheet financing is one device employed.., to reduce the probability of violating debt
covenants .... Companies close to their debt covenants may avoid technical default with an
RDLP because capital raised by the RDLP is not recorded as a liability ...."); Terry Shevlin,
Taxes and Off-Balance-Sheet: Research andDevelopmentLimited Partnerships,62 AccT. REv.
480, 480 (1987) ("Factors favoring use of an LP [limited partnership] include taxes, offbalance-sheet financing and risk-shifting from the R&D firm onto other parties."). But see
Thomas W. Bates. Kathleen M. Kahle & Rene M. Stultz, Why Do U.S. Firms Hold So Much
More Cash Than They Used To?, 64 J. FIN. 1985, 1985 (2009) (noting a doubling in the average
cash to assets ratio of United States industrials between 1980 and 2006 such that the additional
cash accumulation on average wipes out the firms' debt obligations resulting in a net no
leverage position). They explain the phenomenon as characterizing firms with relatively risky
cash flows (including firms with more recent IPOs) and which do not pay dividends. These
firms have decreased inventories and capital expenditures, and increased research and
development budgets. This is an interesting and plausible explanation for the data reported in
the text. One potential flaw in their research is their use ofCOMPUSTAT data which does not
reflect off-balance sheet financing. Although some effects of off-balance sheet financing may
be reflected in this data in the form of market value of assets, which they use as one variable, it
is unlikely to capture anything close to the magnitude of off-balance sheet financing.
76. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS PURSUANT To SECTION 401 (c) OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 ON
ARRANGEMENTS WITH OFF-BALANCE SHEET IMPLICATIONS, SPECIAL PURPOSE ENTITIES, AND
TRANSPARENCY OF FILING BY ISSUERS 16 (2005).
77. See id.at 60 n. 154 (citing a report by the Equipment Leasing Association). Corporate
obligations under finance leases are, for all relevant purposes, the functional equivalent of debt

payments.
78. Miller and Bahnson, supra note 75, who, while calling the practice fraudulent, note
that it winds up being more damaging than helpful to the corporation engaging in extensive offbalance sheet financing.
79. See Peter L. Rousseau, Security Issues and Net Change in Outstanding Corporate
Securities: 1934-1999, in MU.LENNIAL STATISTiCS, supranote 32, tbl.Cj817-830 (illustrating
slightly positive issuances from 1946-1977 with variance increasing thereafter but trending
significantly negatively); infraFigure 7; see also Hall, supranote 29, at 1192 (noting that equity
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Figure 7: Corporate Equity-Net Issues (Billions of Dollars)

The puzzle begins to clarify when we separate out nonfmancial
corporations from financial corporations. Figure 8 shows an immaterial
positive blip here and there but tending around zero to deeply negative, largely
following the overall story for all corporations.8 0

figures tend to be overstated). Although without addressing this particular data set, Hall notes
that equity figures tend to be overstated, although not grossly, because "[c]orporations
frequently barter their equity for the services of employees." Id. This occurs as a result of
corporate founders retaining significant portions of their equity and because employees often
receive stock as a portion of their compensation. Id. While founders can almost certainly be
said to have put up some portion of the corporation's risk capital, stock compensation to
employees, while offering them a participation in profits, in no way can be said to raise external
equity for the purpose of financing production. See Fama & French, supranote 18, at 549-55
(discussing their findings that equity offerings are far more frequent than had been supposed).
During the three-year period that ended on September 30, 2007, nonfinancial corporations
included in the S&P 500 increased their long-term debt only 6%, compared with an overall debt
increase (including financial corporations) of 76.1%. See Rousseau, supra note 79, tbl.Cj 817830 (showing slightly positive issuances from 1946-1947 with variance increasing thereafter but
trending significantly negatively).
80. Infra Figure 8.
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Figure 8: Corporate Equity-Nonfinancial Corporations
(Billions of Dollars)

Mapping the same data for financial corporations, as shown in Figure 9,
completes the explanation. Note that the first major uptrend begins almost
precisely at the time of the beginning of the going-private movement, when
overall equity issuances were down, and that the most recent and significant uptrend begins in 1997, just a year after the big dip for all corporations started
during the dot-com boom.
Figure 9: Corporate Equity-Financial Corporations (Billions of Dollars)
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The implications for the structure of the American economy are
significant. The data suggest that America's economy is based increasingly on
finance, and that our public financial markets principally are financing
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finance. 8 1 At a minimum, it appears clear that industrial corporations are not

obtaining their net financing from publicly issued equity.
A relatively recent explanation for the increasing disappearance of
industrial equity is the boom in stock buybacks. The numbers from 1988
through 2008 are presented as Figure 10 and in tabular form in Appendix B.
The decrease in net equity issuances by financial corporations beginning in
2004 can be accounted for at least in part by stock buybacks, but this activity
began to diminish.82 Financial corporations accounted for only 13.4% of
buybacks in the fourth quarter of 2007 in contrast to 22.3% for the fourth
83
quarter of 2006, most likely reflecting their growing liquidity problems.
Figure 10: S&P 500--Stock Buybacks (Billions of Dollars)
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Buybacks, with just a few exceptions, trailed dividends until the fourth
quarter of 2004.8 Then buybacks soared, both absolutely and in relationship to
81. See generally Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Morals ofthe Marketplace, 20 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REv. 171 (2009). in this Article, I further explore the concept that our public financial
markets essentially finance themselves. Within limits, such a concept is not necessarily a bad
thing and may in fact hold the key to explaining the nexus between stock market development
and real economic growth. On the other hand, and as I suggest elsewhere, such an economic
structure creates significant distorting effects on the real economy.
82. See HOWARD SILvERBLATr & DAvE GuARiNo, S&P BuYBACKs: THREE YEARs AND
$1.3 TRILLION LATER 6 (Dec. 13, 2007) (discussing stock buyback activity during 2004),
available at http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/index/121307_SP500_THREE_
YEARSOFBUYBACKS.pdf.
83. Press Release, Standard & Poor's, S&P 500 Buybacks Set Record of $589 Billion in
2007 1 (Apr. 7, 2007) (discussing stock buyback activity during 2007), available at
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/index/040708_ SP500_BUYBACK PR.pdf.
84. See id. (comparing buybacks with dividends).
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dividends. In the three-year period that ended December 31, 2007, the
corporations comprising the S&P 500 spent $1.44 trillion in buybacks,
compared to $1.56 trillion on capital expenditures and $721 billion on
dividends. 85 And while aggregate data can be misleading, for the three years
ending with the third quarter of 2007, 279 of the S&P 500 companies had spent
more on buybacks than on capital investment.8 6 During this period, 12.5% of
the outstanding shares on the market were removed due to buybacks alone, just
under a majority of which went into treasury stock with the balance used for
M&A and options. 87 While there are legitimate business reasons for
corporations to engage in buybacks, the result has been a significant distortion
in earnings per share and an artificial increase in stock prices.8 8
Figure 11 breaks out total dividend payouts and share repurchases by S&P
500 corporations, showing their levels relative to one another and to the S&P
500 index since 1998, completing the picture of the substantial degree
to which
89
these corporations have been returning wealth to shareholders.

85. Id; SILvERBLATr & GuAluNo, supra note 82, at 1.
86. SILVERBLATT & GuARmnO, supra note 82, at 1.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 10-11.
89. I explore the slightly different relationship of capital gains to dividends in Part III.B.
See also John D. Stowe, Dennis W. McLeavey & Jerald E. Pinto, Share RepurchasesandStock
Valuation Models, 35 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 170, 170-71 (2009). Clearly corporations issue
equity, as Fama & French, supra note 18, describe. See generally Ritter, supra note 17
(providing an extensive database documenting the numbers of common stock public offerings).
On net, however, it appears that corporations return more equity than they issue.
For a thorough analysis of both the potentially beneficial and harmful impacts on corporate
welfare of stock buyback programs, with particular reference to their effects on corporate
governance, see William W. Bratton, The New Dividend Puzzle, 93 GEo. L.J. 845 (2005)
(analyzing the potentially beneficial and harmful impacts of stock buyback programs on
corporate welfare, with particular reference to their effects on corporate governance).
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Figure 11: S&P 500 Payouts, 1998-2007
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C. Summary Conclusion: Creditors Make, ShareholdersTake
The data are clear. Creditors own American business. Public
shareholders have made little contribution to the core functions of American
industrial corporations, the financing of productive activity. Indeed, as the data
from the last quarter of the twentieth century suggest, public shareholders have
been net consumers rather than providers of corporate equity capital. The
argument for expanded shareholder rights cannot be supported by the idea that
shareholders contribute value to American industrial production and thus
financial growth. In order to support the legitimate expansion of shareholder
rights, its supporters must make a case that public shareholders make some
other kind of contribution to the American economy. 9°
Moreover, the withdrawn equity has been replaced by debt. It is clear that
as early as the middle of the twentieth century, the profits of public
shareholders piggybacked on the risk capital contributed by debtholders or, to
put it differently, that creditors were providing the bulk of the risk capital that
90. There is a growing literature debating the question of whether the stock market as an
institution stimulates economic growth. That is a question I will examine in a future paper.
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had not been generated from the early investments of entrepreneurs. Now, one
could argue that the legal claims of equity and debt have long been settled such
that this observation, while interesting, is not problematic. But the overlay of
legal form on economic reality shows that those who control the risk capitalthe shareholders-do not provide that risk capital. The mismatch permits
managers, who are put in place indirectly by the shareholders, to engage in risktaking with potentially large benefit to the shareholders but with potentially
significant adverse consequences to the debtholders. Again, the established
existence of legal forms, along with the ability of creditors to self-protect
through contract, may not make this a problem of fairness as between the
different financial claimants. 91 But it does present a problem of incentives that
have potentially significant negative effects on the productive economy.
Managerial incentives can be distorted significantly by the existing regime
of shareholder participation rights, and the problem obviously would be
exaggerated by an expansion of shareholder rights. But shareholders are seen
to be risk-bearers of sorts. Perhaps this would justify a regime of expanded
rights, even if those rights posed some macroeconomic risks. It is to this
question that I now turn.
IlI. Equity Without Risk
In this Section, I put aside the data I presented in Part II and the
conclusions to be drawn from them-public shareholders have no legitimate
corporate participation rights because they make no positive contribution to
American industry-to address two additional important points. The first is the
argument that shareholders should have corporate participation rights because
they take on the risk-bearing function of American industry.92 My conclusion
is that, even assuming my data is wrong, a close look at modem finance theory
leads to the conclusion that the only risks public shareholders take are those
that they create themselves. This lends no support at all to an argument in favor
of expanded shareholder rights, and probably undercuts it.
The second point is to question the frequently asserted equivalence of
dividends and capital gains because it is here that the greatest potential damage

91.

For my own analysis of the fairness considerations arising in the conflicts between

debt and equity, see Lawrence E. Mitchell, The FairnessRights of CorporateBondholders, 65
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1213-31 (1990) (discussing the fairness considerations arising in conflicts
between debt and equity).
92. This standard argument is described in STEPHEN BAImRIDGE, CORPORATION LAw AND

EcoNoMIcs at 10.3(c) (2002).
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to the real economy from expanded shareholder rights is demonstrated.9 3 From
the perspective of the corporation's long-term business health, the two are
rather dramatically different. 94 But the history of investment in America shows
a marked shift from the expectation of dividends to that of capital gains, 95
which has distorted managerial incentives in a way that encourages managers to
harm the long-term health of their corporations' businesses in order to satisfy
current shareholder demands. Again, the conclusion to be drawn is that
shareholder rights exacerbate the problem and thus should be quite limited.
A. Shareholdersas Risk-Bearers
The development literature I referred to earlier in this Article gives
significant pride of place to the role of financial institutions like the stock
market in overcoming information asymmetries and facilitating liquid
markets.96 The macroeconomic literature connects this function with economic
growth by arguing that financial institutions thus overcome barriers to
investment, opening the investment markets to large numbers of participants
over whom the risk of loss is broadly distributed.97 In the absence of the
evidence I provided in Part II, the legal literature has justified shareholder
participation rights at least in part on this perceived risk of lOSS. 98 The
argument, in brief, is that because shareholders are the corporation's residual
risk bearers, they have the greatest incentives of all corporate stakeholders to
monitor corporate management, and it is therefore efficient to assign this role to
them through the medium of voting rights. 99
Thus, I will turn, in this part, to one of the principal perceived benefits of
these market functions, the facilitation of risk sharing among a broad group of
investors. For regardless of what I have thus far demonstrated, it is taken
93. See infra notes 124-25 and accompanying text (discussing the assertion that dividends
and capital gains are equal).
94. Infra note 124 and accompanying text.
95. See Bratton, supra note 89, at 845 n.3 (discussing the history of the shift in
expectation from dividends to capital gains after the First World War).
96. See Levine, Views and Agenda, supra note 20, at 693 ("By facilitating trade, stock
markets reduce liquidity risk.").
97. See id. at 694 ("The financial system's ability to provide risk diversification sources
can affect long run economic growth by altering resource allocation and the saving rates.").
98. See Bebchuk, supra note 5, at 895 ("Given that it is their money that is on the line,
shareholders naturally would have incentives to make the decision that would best serve their
interest.").
99. See BAIMRrDGE, supra note 92, at 469-72 (discussing why shareholders, and only
shareholders, should be assigned voting rights).
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almost as an article of faith in the finance and corporate literature that
shareholders do indeed assume the risk-bearing function of corporate
productivity, and this, in a meaningful sense, justifies their participation
rights. 0 0 While I have already demonstrated that public shareholders do not
own the risk capital of American industry, it would be idle to deny that in fact
they bear some risk; they can and do lose money from investing in poorly
performing corporations. Moreover, the argument is sufficiently embedded that
it justifies discussion. Therefore I will turn briefly to the microeconomic
literature to evaluate precisely what risks are actually born by public
shareholders.
Assume that shareholders do, in a meaningful way, take the risk of failure
resulting from poor corporate production and innovation, and that they are
motivated to do so in part because they have access to information that permits
intelligent decisionmaking. This information also facilitates the transfer of
shares among investors. The question is how shareholders assume this risk.
They do so by purchasing stock, but well before the seminal work of Graham
and Dodd,' 0 it was widely acknowledged that the purchase of stock in a single
public company was a poor investment strategy. That argument has been
refined over time into what is generally known as modem finance theory. One
aspect of that theory, portfolio theory, first developed by Harry Markowitz in
1952, addressed the question of how an investor should maximize the value of
his investment.' 0 2 The answer was to achieve a balance between moderating
variance and return on his investment by creating an efficient portfolio, that is,
one that either provided the highest return for a given level of variance or the
lowest risk for a given retum.'0 3 By so doing, that is to say, by diversifying his
investments, each shareholder could achieve the maximum return for a given
level of risk.
14 The wisdom of investing in this manner followed as a matter of
05
course.1

100. See JOHN R. BOATRIGHT, ETHmcs INFINANCE 179 (1999) ("In the contractual theory,
the arguments for shareholder control turn on the fact that shareholders bear residual risk.").
101. See generally BENJAMIN GRAHAM & DAVID L. DODD, SECURITY ANALYSIS (1934)
(proving tests of fundamental valuation).
102. Id. at 77-79.
103. Harry Markowitz, Foundationsof Portfolio Theory, 46 J. FN. 469, 470-73 (1991);
Harry Markowitz, PortfolioSelection, 7 J. FIN. 77, 77 (1952).
104. Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, supra note 103, at 89-91.
105. See MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY, supra note 11, at 275 ("CAPM allows
investors to build the kinds of potentially lower-risk, high-return portfolios described by
Markowitz .... Almost every American who invests in the market through mutual funds or
other institutional media has invested on the basis of CAPM.").
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But what are the risks involved? The microeconomic literature is careful
in categorizing risk, which is refined in the capital asset pricing model. 0 6 The
capital asset pricing model followed relatively quickly on the heels of
Markowitz's work. As William Sharpe observed in his famous contribution to
the creation of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), if stockholders can
eliminate the risk of loss from any particular corporation by diversifying, a
corporation must only compensate its shareholders-its risk-bearing
specialists-for taking nondiversifiable risks. 10 7
What risks are
nondiversifiable? Those that exist in the market itself, like risks of inflation,
market bubbles, major political events, the impact of economic cycles, the
unavailability of credit, and the like. 10 8 So far, so good.
But notice the paradox. If the only risk for which corporations must (and
therefore will) compensate shareholders is the risk inherent in the market, then
the only risks in which shareholders are specialists are market risks. In the
absence of a stock market or, to put it differently, in an economy based largely
on the provision of external financing by specialized institutions, those
institutions would, as they do, demand compensation for the risk of loss
inherent in specific corporate investments. While systematic risk would still
exist, it would be tempered by significant alpha, that is, corporate-specific
returns, and it is likely that much systematic risk would be diminished by
eliminating the market. There would, in other words, be no need for the risk
specialization services provided by shareholders, which is to assume systematic
risk.
Put yet another way, the logic of finance theory seems to lead to the
conclusion that the only risks in which shareholders specialize are the risks that
they themselves, aggregated in the institution of the market, create, since it is
they, and not banks or public debtholders, who are uniquely dependent upon
beta for their returns. 0 9 Consequently, it seems as if the risk-specialization
106. William Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under
Conditions ofRisk, 19 J. FIN. 425 (1964). It is commonly said that diversification "eliminates"
the risk of holding stock in a particular corporation. This is obviously incorrect. If you own the
stock of corporation A in your portfolio and A goes bankrupt, you have lost your investment in
A. It is more accurate to say that the impact of that loss on your overall portfolio is balanced by
potential gains in the stock of other corporations you own.
107. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 92, at 117-18 ("Investors can eliminate unsystematic risk
by diversifying their portfolio.... A well-diversified investor thus need not be concerned with
unsystematic risk and therefore will not demand to be compensated for that risk.... Ergo
investors will demand to be compensated for bearing systematic risk.").
108. See MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY, supra note 11, at 274 ("The only
nondiversifiable risk was the risk inherent in the market itself and therefore common to all
securities.").
109. I do not mean to suggest that systematic risk would be entirely eliminated or that
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argument for the presence of public shareholders, and thus the stock market,
becomes weaker. The logic of risk-specialization
is a consequence of the
0
existence of the market, not a justification for it."l
Now I confess that this reasoning moves a bit too quickly. Despite the
claims of portfolio theory, or at least those made on behalf of portfolio theory,
stockholders still buy stock in specific companies, and still take the risk of
holding stock in specific companies, no matter the facility with which they can
diversify in order to minimize that risk. In the absence of a market that allowed
such diversification, shareholders would, so the argument continues, refuse to
invest in specific companies and would therefore fail to provide the capital
necessary to finance industry.
But the logical end of the specialization argument returns us to the premise
that stockholders provide financing for industrial production. And that is
precisely the question at issue, the answer to which is suggested by the data.
For those data demonstrate that stockholders do not importantly provide
financing for industrial production, both as an historical and as a contemporary
matter. That financing historically has come principally from retained earnings
and debt."' While the argument from finance theory is elegant and is logical
within its assumptions, the assumptions fall on the facts.
The conclusion remains that stockholders can be seen as specialists in risk
bearing only because of the existence of a public market, and the market exists
primarily as a historically contingent fact, largely unrelated to the financing of
productive enterprise. If this is true, then the market exists for the sake of the
financial institutions would not suffer in their investments from systematic risk. What I do mean
to suggest is that the return demanded by financial institutions, whose profits would come not
from trading but from dividends and interest, would likely be more finely calibrated to the risks
inherent in individual corporate investments rather than exogenous factors. A closer correlation
between actual corporate performance and returns on investments would likely result. I do think
it is fair to note that the same result could be accomplished in the stock market if each market
participant (or the overwhelming majority of market participants) invested on the basis of
fundamentals and focused more on returns from corporate cash flow than from trading profits.
110. As I later discuss, this was historically true during the greatest period of American
industrialization before the emergence of the modem stock market. And while the failed
conglomeration movement of the 1960s suggests the perils of overdiversified corporations, at
least some of the great nineteenth century industrialists did at least vertically integrate their
businesses as a protection against volatility in various supply markets. See infra Part III.B
(discussing the evolution of the modem stock market during the period of American
industrialization).
11.
Because the data demonstrated a dramatic recent decrease in retained earnings, it is
fair to ask whether the historic reliance on internal financing can continue. In light of current
economic conditions, I think it is reasonable to suspect that many corporations will begin again
to retain earnings to support their stock prices, much as they did in the early part of the
twentieth century. Infra Part III.B.
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market, and investment in equities very much resembles the gambling it is often
accused of being.1 2 Modem finance theory nicely illustrates the gap between
the real economy and the finance economy, and raises significant questions
about public shareholders' real contribution13 to economic growth. The
argument from risk-bearing proves too much.'
B. The UnbearableLightness of CapitalGains

Our state and federal regulatory models treat public shareholders as
investors in American corporations. But I will show that the historical trend
demonstrates that the market is more properly described as a speculative arena,
and that those who buy and sell stocks have come far less to resemble investors
than traders for short-term profit. Stock market volatility has increased
dramatically since 1980, during the same period in which a precipitous drop in
internal resources was matched with a run-up in borrowed funds."14 Empirical
evidence increasingly points to a managerial focus on short-term stock prices
during this period, even at the expense ofbusiness development, culminating in
the dramatic increase in stock buybacks from 2004 to 2007, a period during
which the S&P 500 spent more (in the aggregate, and more as a simple majority
of corporations) on stock buybacks than on productive capital, and dramatically
more than on research and development.'' 5
The historical record demonstrates a significant shift in investment style.
Through the 1950s, those who invested in public equity did so primarily for
112.
113.

Mitchell, supra note 81.
I again defer a question, that is, whether the stock market helps financial institutions

to allocate capital more broadly, and especially debt capital. While important to analyzing the
appropriate design and regulation of markets, it is beyond the scope of the issue of shareholder

rights.
114. Kenneth A. Froot, Andre Perold, and Jeremy C. Stein, in Shareholder Trading
Practicesand Corporateinvestment Horizons, 5 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 42, 44-48 (1992), make

a careful argument that distinguishes mere turnover from real volatility, and argue that while
turnover has significantly increased, volatility has not as a result of increased market capacity.
They do, however, note the possibility that informational asymmetries between management and

the market might well induce short-term managerial incentives. Id. at 50-56. While their
argument is powerful, it is somewhat limited by the fact that it was made in 1992 before the very
dramatic turnover increases in the early twenty-first century. It would be interesting to apply
their methodology to that period to see if their conclusions hold.
115. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Who Needs the Stock Market? Part I: The Empirical
Evidence 24 (ExpressO Working Paper Series, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract-id=1292403 ("Why are industrial corporations eating their public

and internal equity in pure financial transactions? One answer is that the elimination of equity
artificially boosts share prices in order to satisfy short-term investor demands.").
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dividends. Indeed the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) emphasized
dividends in its "Own Your Share of American Business" campaign to induce
larger numbers of Americans to invest in the stock market, as well as to
establish a broader base with which to lobby against double taxation.1 16 But
matters changed in the 1960s and have continued along the path then set. The
desire for dividends gave way to the demand for capital appreciation.
To some extent, this shift was planned and encouraged by the NYSE,
suffering from a lack of business in the 1950s. The NYSE clearly
contemplated that increasing share ownership would enhance the speculative
character of the market (as eventually it did).' 1 7 For example, in its 1955
Annual Report, it noted the low annual turnover of 19%, stating that "[t]his is
to be expected, of course, in a cash market of an investment character." ' 8 Low
turnover meant low commissions and low profits for the specialists that
controlled the NYSE, and it went on to complain that the Federal Reserve
Board, through a lack of understanding of the importance of securities credit,
had raised margin requirements twice that year."1 9 The annual report describes
that the NYSE
devoted increasing effort to research and education in this area ....[I]t
should be made clear that an excessively high level of initial margin
requirements, at a time when there is only a modest amount of credit
employed by the securities industry, can be harmful to the nation's20entire
economy by adversely affecting the liquidity of our marketplace. 1
While buying stock on margin could in fact be consistent with the desire for
dividends, it is significantly more related to investing for capital appreciation.
Explosive market development in the succeeding years, with a marked turn to
investing for capital gains, demonstrates the success of the NYSE's programs,
116. As recently as the late 1950s, investing for dividends was the dominant style. See,
e.g., New York Stock Exchange and Affiliated Companies, Annual Report for 1955 [hereinafter
NYSE Annual Report for 1955] (available at the New York Stock Exchange Archives).
117. Id.at 2. But see EDWIN J. PERKINS, FROM WALL STREET TO MAIN STREET: CHARLES
MERRILL AND MIDDLE CLASS INVESTORS 145-61 (1999) (chronicling the development of Charles
Merrill's new investment strategies). One exception to the drive toward speculation appears to
have been Charles Merrill and the firm he founded. Merrill was perhaps the greatest popularizer
of post-Depression common stock investment and a creator of the NYSE's monthly investment
plan. Merrill appears to have been concerned with ensuring that new investors were careful in
assessing the risks they took and prudent in their investments. The biography, apparently the
first on Merrill, is a bit hagiographic; but it provides some support for the idea that Merrill
popularized common stock investing in a fairly conservative way.
118. NYSE Annual Report for 1955, supranote 116, at 2.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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despite the failure of the
Fed significantly to reduce (and even sometimes to
121
increase) margin rates.
This shift to capital gains investing has significant implications for the
appropriate role of public shareholders. The famous Miller-Modigliani
irrelevance theory, which, although debated, has wide adherence, holds that
transactions costs and taxation left aside, investors should be rationally
indifferent between receiving dividends and capital gains.122 If the market is
efficient-an increasingly dubious proposition12 3 -public stock prices in a
broad and efficient market should discount all future cash flows to present
value and incorporate them in the stock price. 24 Thus, one could receive
dividends over the long term by holding onto the stock, or receive them now by
selling the stock and receiving future dividends in the form of capital gains, as
well as the proportion of the selling price that captures the seller's share of
market is speculative in character does
retained earnings. Whether or not the
125
not matter, as long as it is efficient.
But this argument ignores one very important fact. With certain rare
exceptions, dividends must be paid out of cash earned currently, or at least cash
that is owned by the corporation and therefore certain. Discounted future
dividends, even if the market is efficient, are a risky proposition. Because they
will only come in the future, they do not exist at the time that a stockholder
sells his shares for capital appreciation. And, as a matter of financial reality,
they are only as good as the assumptions one makes in applying various
valuation models to the corporation's earnings and cash flows. 126 So in one
121. See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, 94TH ANNUAL REPORT
2007, at 323 (Apr. 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
rptcongress/annua07/pdf/AR07.pdf (analyzing the initial margin requirements under
Regulations T, U, and X); see also Peter Fortunte, MarginRequirements, Margin Loans, and
MarginRates: Practicesand Principles,NEW ENGLAND ECON. REV., Sept.-Oct. 2000, at 24,

25-32 (discussing the history and practice of margin requirements and its impact on investment
strategies).
122. See Franco Modigliani & Merton Miller, The Cost of Capital, CorporationFinance,
and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261, 265-71 (1958) (formulating a theory
which considers whether there is such a thing as an optimal debt-equity ratio); see also
LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM & JEFFREY J. HAAS, CORPORATE FINANCE

AND GOVERNANCE 757-63 (3d ed. 2006) (providing a broader discussion ofthe issue, including
challenges to the Miller-Modigliani theory).
123. Antawabi & Stout, supra note 3, at 1274-90.
124. See Merton Miller& Franco Modigliani, DividendPolicy, Growth, andthe Valuation
of Shares, 34 J. Bus. 411,415-16 (1961) (discussing the discounted cash flow approach).
125. See id. at 426-31 (evaluating their theory when the element of uncertainty is
introduced).
126. Marco Pagano, Fabiano Panetta & Luigi Zingales, Why Do Companies Go Public?
An EmpiricalAnalysis,53 J. FIN. 27, 28 (1998) (studying a sample of Italian corporations and
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very real sense, the capital gains seller is shorting future dividends, and the
capital gains buyer is gambling that the rather significant assumptions upon
which valuation models are built turn out to be correct, or at least that he can
find someone else to buy the stock who believes them to be correct. Moreover,
as the data show, retained earnings have more or less disappeared from the
books of industrial corporations, so the capital gains trader is effectively buying
or selling what used to be referred to as "water." While financial theory might
establish equivalence, in real economic terms, taking one's profits in capital
gains (taken as discounted future cash flows rather than as accumulated
retained earnings) is a very different proposition from receiving a check from a
corporation with money in the bank.
The disappearance of retained earnings might well have significant
implications for the continuing legitimacy of the Modigliani-Miller theory.
Modigliani and Miller published their papers in 1958 and 1961. As the data
presented in Part II show, in 1961 retained earnings constituted between 40%
(my data) and 61% (Sametz's data) of corporate balance sheets. In a very real
sense at that time, capital gains appear to have been supported by real deferred
dividends, held as retained earnings, and while one assumes that market
movements also affected stockholder profits, there were balance sheet assets to
support stock prices. 27 The situation is dramatically different where, as we see
in 2005, retained earnings constitute 11% of corporate balance sheets' equity.
Capital gains are no longer supported by balance sheet assets. Market
movements constitute virtually the entire amount of shareholder capital gains.
Whatever power the irrelevance theory had at mid-century, the disappearance
of retained earnings would seem to cast it in an entirely different, and far less
persuasive, light.
28
The contemporary capital gains situation has historical precedent.
During the great merger wave, which took place in the United States between
1897 and 1903, $20 billion of new capitalization entered the American
29
economy in the form of newly created common and preferred stock.
Changes in New Jersey law permitted trust promoters to create holding
concluding that investment and profitability tend to diminish following an IPO, and that the
greatest single predictor of whether a firm will undertake an IPO is a high market to book ratio).
127. New York Stock Exchange Factbook, http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/
asp/factbooklviewer edition.asp?mode--table&key=2206&category=4 (last visited Sept. 1,
2009) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). As to stock price movements, it is
worth noting that volatility, expressed as turnover, was very low.
128. See generallyMITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY, supra note 11 (examining the
stock market trends during the early decades of the twentieth century).
129. Id. at8-11.
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companies, issue as much stock as they liked, and use it to buy up existing
industrial enterprises, combining them (typically) into huge horizontally
integrated companies. 1" ° The promoters and sellers then dumped their stock on
the market before the new combinations had to show much profit or justify
their stock prices, and an eager middle class was ready to buy.13 ' Not
surprisingly, stock prices collapsed in 1903, leaving much of the newly issued
stock well below its issuance price (although quite likely more realistically in
line with its value). The consequences for corporate finance were significant.
U.S. Steel, for example, spent most of the first thirty years of its existence
building its retained earnings in
order to support its initial (and rapidly
32
demolished) public stock price. 1
We do not believe in watered stock anymore. Much work in finance
theory has been directed to showing how public markets correct mispricing.
And in fact, even during the merger wave (which raised issues of
overcapitalization that concerned policymakers for decades), many of the new
combinations found that they had to adjust either their stock prices or the
quantities issued in order to sell their offerings.' 33 Nonetheless, the grain of
truth that lay in the overcapitalization argument, whether or not it should have
been troubling, was that corporations could not in fact be liquidated for their
stock prices, that profit was pretty exclusively on the come. The demand for
dividends disciplined corporate managers to concentrate on generating real
earnings and cash flow out of which to pay them. 34 The shift to capital gains
investing removed that discipline. In an environment dominated by the desire
for capital gains, profits are provided by the market, not by the profits of
production. Thus, CAPM links up with history, and, as I noted earlier, a
principal reason that traders make money in the stock market is from the
existence of the market itself. The effort shifts from achieving gains from
production to using the corporate machinery to manipulate stock price. We
may not believe in watered stock anymore, but the evidence of its effects is now
painfully clear. Increasing the rights of shareholders will merely exacerbate the
problem.
130. Id. at 45-56.
131. See id. at 68 ("The promoters had to be paid as well, and expected to be paid very
handsomely. The cheapest way for the combination to pay them was also in stock, which
promoters would commonly dump on the market during the initial excitement surrounding its
creation.").
132. DAvID L. DODD, STOCK WATERING: THE JUDICIAL VALUATION OF PROPERTY FOR
STOCK ISSUE PURPOSES 60-75 (1930).
133. See MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY, supranote 11, at 60-62 (discussing the
problems associated with overcapitalization during the merger wave).
134. Id. at 95-98.
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IV. The Legitimate Rights of Public Shareholders
A. State Law

The subject of existing legal rights of shareholders is so well-known as to
merit relatively brief mention here. Simply put, and as a general matter,
shareholders vote to elect directors; approve certain fundamental decisions
made by directors-like amending the corporate charter, engaging in mergers
and sales of substantially all of a corporation's assets, and, with qualification,
adopting and amending by-laws-remove directors for cause; obtain access to
certain corporate books and records; and receive material information with
respect to their voting.' 35 The federal securities laws overlay these state-given
rights with basic disclosure requirements. 136 Whether or not these rights have
been exercised meaningfully, it is fair to say that shareholders already have the
right to be heard on some of the most essential aspects of corporate governance
and finance.
As both the empirical data and theoretical arguments I have presented
make clear, debt and retained earnings are by far the primary sources from
which at least reasonably mature businesses finance their production. I have
also argued that, to the extent that public shareholders are said to be specialists
in risk bearing, the only risks they bear are those they create through the
mechanism of the market. While it remains true that a shareholder can see her
equity investment disappear in bankruptcy, both finance theory and the law
presume that shareholders will diversify so as significantly to mitigate, if not
eliminate, any such losses. 137 As I have further shown, over the past thirty
years debt increasingly has replaced retained earnings as the primary source of
risk capital in American industrial corporations, thus leaving the public equity
holders, whose corporate capital at risk is negligible, in legal control while
managing the money put up by creditors who, while they have the ability to
negotiate some degree of almost entirely negative contractual control through

135. See BAINBRIDGE, supranote 92, at 442-44 (providing an overview of the legal rights
of shareholders); Bebchuk, supra note 5, at 844-47 (discussing shareholder rights shared
throughout many of the states).
136. See BAINBRIDGE, supranote 92, at 443 ("Federal law governs the procedures by which
shareholders vote and the disclosures to which shareholders are entitled.").
137. Indeed one famous justification for the director-protective business judgment rule is
that shareholders do, or ought to, diversify and that if they fail to do so, they should receive no
legal protection from even significant business mistakes. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880,
880-82 (2d Cir. 1982) (justifying the scope of the business judgment rule on this ground).
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covenants,38 have no significant ongoing participatory role in corporate
conduct.
This analysis leads to some conclusions about the appropriate place of
public equity holders in American industrial corporations, and some questions
about our current mode of regulation. If, as the development literature holds,
information rights and exit rights are the principal mechanisms through which
the public market makes itself of use in stimulating production, then it would
seem logical to limit the rights of public equity holders precisely to the receipt
of information, as is currently required under the federal securities laws, and of
course the right to sell their shares, which follows both as a matter of corporate
law and simple concepts of property. The right to participate in ongoing
corporate affairs, such as by voting, appears to offer no benefit to corporate
production and may, as I have been at pains to suggest throughout, create
potentially dangerous distortions in managerial incentives. Thus, ideally
(although most likely improbably), the right of public shareholders to vote
should be eliminated. 139 At a minimum, their rights should not be expanded or
enhanced.
This is not to say that corporate governance should be revamped entirely.
In the first place, the market for corporate control will still create a powerful
incentive for managers to be attentive to shareholder returns.1 40 It may be that
managers choose to avail themselves of takeover protections that activist
shareholders abhor, which would of course diminish the effect of that market,
but if this is a suboptimal practice we can assume, or at least postulate, that the
market will discount for it and such managers will be punished through
diminished share prices and perhaps a higher cost of capital. Whether or not
the practice is suboptimal is, of course, a subject of lively debate. But it will
allow the managers to make a determination as to whether they think that their
ability to provide long-term value through the profitable production of goods

138. Supra Part ll.B.
139. I do not address, as the issue is beyond the scope of my task here, how directors and
managers would be appointed in the absence of shareholder elections. One possible suggestion
is that shareholders and creditors vote, perhaps as one class or several, solely for the election of
directors and nothing more. Another is to permit shareholders to vote for directors but to stretch
their terms to, say, five years, as Martin Lipton has suggested, in order to diminish the effects of
short-term market and shareholder pressure on management. Martin Lipton & Steven A.
Rosenblum, A New System of CorporateGovernance: The QuinquennialElection ofDirectors,
58 U. CH. L. R. 187, 225-33 (1991) (proposing an alternative approach for electing directors);
MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRREsPoNsILrrY, supra note 9, at 129-32 (discussing the possibility
and benefits of quinquennial elections).
140. See MITCHELL, CoRPoRATE IRRESPoNsIBILIY, supranote 9, at 130-34 (demonstrating
the pressure that market forces place on directors to be attentive to shareholders' interests).
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and services is greater than whatever benefit might result from market pressures
to maintain high stock prices.
There is another aspect of state corporate governance law that should be
maintained, and that is the law of fiduciary obligation. 141This is probably even
more significant in the absence of voting rights. Despite their insignificant role
in financing corporate productivity, public shareholders do put their money at
risk through a legally and socially sanctioned mechanism whereby they are
vulnerable to the actions of others. 142 Thus, the traditional duties of care and
loyalty, to the extent that they are effective, serve to limit the ability of
managers to steal or shirk, while their freedom from voting pressure would
permit them to manage the corporation as they see fit.
B. Information and Exit: FederalSecurities Regulation
The federal securities laws perform different tasks than state corporate
laws, and to the extent that difference is more or less complete, serve a salutary
function. 143 Because, as the development literature holds, the dissemination of
information is one of the principal benefits of a public stock market, the
mandatory disclosure system should naturally be maintained, as should antifraud and anti-manipulation laws that keep the markets honest (and these latter
for much the same reasons that I argued for maintaining fiduciary
obligation). 144 Those aspects of federal law designed to enhance the practice of
shareholder democracy, in particular the shareholder proposal rule, Rule 14a8,145 and, depending upon the method chosen to select directors, the proxy rules
of Section 14,146 would obviously serve no purpose in a regime of state
corporate law in which shareholders were prohibited from voting. Thus, these
141. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairnessand Trust in CorporateLaw, 43 DUKE L. J. 425,
480 (1993) ("Fiduciary duty, then, is an important contribution to establishing the conditions for
the trust necessary to permit the corporation to exist and function. ..").
142. See id.
at 488-91 (arguing for strong fiduciary obligations in light of shareholders'
vulnerability to managerial misconduct).
143. See Roberta S. Karmel, Reconciling Federal and State Interests in Securities
Regulation in the United States and Europe, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 495, 495-97 (2003)
(discussing the distinct features and application of state and federal securities laws in the United
States).
144. These disclosure obligations principally are set out in the Securities Act of 1933 and
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aaa
(2006); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2006).
145. Securities and Exchange Commission Rule on Shareholder Proposals, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-8 (2008).
146. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14.
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aspects of federal regulation, those that mesh with the state law model of
shareholder "ownership" of the corporation, as well as the considerable direct
and indirect costs of maintaining them, would disappear.
C. Conclusion
Based on both theory and evidence, it seems reasonable to conclude that
public shareholders serve only a very limited function in stimulating industrial
production and economic growth in the United States and are potentially
detrimental to the achievement of those goals. While the financial implications
are highly nuanced, the legal implications are rather simple. We have little use
for the congeries of rights that have developed to allow public shareholders to
participate in the governance of those corporations as if they in any meaningful
way made a contribution to improved economic performance. The case for
empowering shareholders falls on the facts.
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Appendix A
Ratio of
Retained
Earnings
to External
Financing

Ratio of
Capital plus
Paid-in
Capital or
Capital
Surplus to
External

Ratio of
Accounts
Payable to
External
Financing

Ratio of
Long-Term
Debt to
External
Financing

Ratio of
Short-Term
Debt to
External
Financing

0.1422
0.1443
0.1441
0.1472
0.1420
0.1331
0.1395
0.1627
0.1373
0.1381
0.1392
0.1434
0.1428
0.1435
0.1378
0.1358
0.1434
0.1539
0.1588
0.1575
0.1654
0.1789
0.1838
0.1818
0.1788
0.1684
0.1521
0.1480
0.1503
0.1324
0.1301
0.1219
0.1178

0.3070
0.3089
0.3218
0.3252
0.3234
0.3247
0.3258
0.3089
0.3206
0.3241
0.3262
0.3269
0.3287
0.3244
0.3358
0.3461
0.3452
0.3424
0.3398
0.3508
0.3531
0.3459
0.3379
0.3308
0.3052
0.3087
0.2997
0.2984
0.2864
0.2852
0.2793
0.2803
0.2691

0.0950
0.0971
0.0943
0.0903
0.0977
0.1044
0.0988
0.1174
0.1204
0.1305
0.1377
0.1354
0.1444
0.1566
0.1582
0.1510
0.1560
0.1661
0.1792
0.1627
0.1547
0.1688
0.1727
0.1692
0.1690
0.1655
0.1720
0.1730
0.1688
0.1578
0.1627
0.1706
0.1731

Financing

1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

0.4368
0.4362
0.4333
0.4204
0.4138
0.3958
0.3808
0.4027
0.4152
0.4188
0.4082
0.4097
0.3931
0.3588
0.3387
0.3393
0.3429
0.3402
0.3263
0.3394
0.3538
0.3703
0.3664
0.3585
0.3374
0.3046
0.2886
0.2612
0.2302
0.2007
0.1749
0.1657
0.1645

0.4557
0.4497
0.4399
0.4373
0.4368
0.4378
0.4360
0.4109
0.4217
0.4073
0.3968
0.3943
0.3841
0.3755
0.3683
0.3672
0.3555
0.3376
0.3223
0.3290
0.3268
0.3064
0.3057
0.3182
0.3470
0.3574
0.3762
0.3805
0.3946
0.4246
0.4278
0.4271
0.4401

THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OFPUBLIC SHAREHOLDERS
Ratio of
Retained
Earnings
to External
Financing

1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

0.1416
0.1325
0.1251
0.1365
0.1262
0.1485
0.1518
0.1641
0.1508
0.1544
0.1201
0.0646
0.0323
0.0677
0.0894
0.1115

Ratio of
Capital plus
Paid-in
Capital or
Capital
Surplus to
External
Financing
0.4416
0.4595
0.4838
0.5148
0.5143
0.5177
0.5248
0.5379
0.5296
0.5353
0.5376
0.5505
0.5613
0.5393
0.5037
0.5226
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Ratio of
Accounts
Payable to
External
Financing

Ratio of
Long-Term
Debt to
External
Financing

Ratio of
Short-Term
Debt to
External
Financing

0.1098
0.1545
0.1402
0.1204
0.1193
0.1185
0.1148
0.1113
0.1117
0.1090
0.1245
0.1190
0.1186
0.1271
0.1540
0.1551

0.2676
0.2480
0.2396
0.2359
0.2303
0.2260
0.2201
0.2147
0.2150
0.2128
0.2048
0.2054
0.2091
0.2163
0.2224
0.2144

0.1810
0.1379
0.1363
0.1289
0.1360
0.1378
0.1403
0.1361
0.1437
0.1429
0.1331
0.1252
0.1110
0.1172
0.1200
0.1079

Appendix B

Mar-98
Jun-98
Sep-98
Dec-98
Mar-99
Jun-99
Sep-99
Dec-99
Mar-00
Jun-00
Sep-00
Dec-00

Market
Value

Operating
Earnings

8,626
8,956
8,125
9,942
10,513
11,232
10,554
12,315
12,686
12,484
12,599
11,715

86
90
83
93
96
108
107
115
118
128
124
116

As
Reported
Earnings
81
78
72
69
90
102
98
107
116
116
120
80

Dividends

Buybacks

29
33
34
32
33
34
37
34
35
35
36
35

26
29
38
32
34
32
31
45
49
37
31
34
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Mar-01
Jun-01
Sep-01
Dec-01
Mar-02
Jun-02
Sep-02
Dec-02
Mar-03
Jun-03
Sep-03
Dec-03
Mar-04
Jun-04
Sep-04
Dec-04
Mar-05
Jun-05
Sep-05
Dec-05
Mar-06
Jun-06
Se -06
Dec-06
Mar-07
Jun-07
Sep-07
Dec-07
Mar-08
Jun-08
Sep-08
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Market
Value

Operating
Earnings

10,385
11,027
9,437
10,463
10,502
9,091
7,518
8,107
7,827
9,001
9,208
10,286
10,461
10,623
10,398
11,289
10,820
10,890
11,083
11,255
11,660
11,497
12,020
12,729
12,706
13,350
13,470
12,868
11,511
11,163
10,181

96
81
83
91
99
107
107
110
115
119
133
138
147
158
157
167
164
178
170
182
187
199
207
197
200
214
184
133
145
148
143

As
Reported
Earnings
82
44
47
50
84
63
79
28
110
103
116
122
141
142
132
130
154
167
161
156
177
182
193
182
191
194
134
69
135
112
86

Source: S&P 2008

Dividends

Buybacks

34
35
38
36
35
38
36
39
36
38
40
47
42
43
46
50
49
49
49
55
53
54
55
62
58
59
61
67
62
62
61

31
34
35
33
30
31
35
31
30
28
34
39
43
42
46
66
82
81
81
104
100
117
110
105
118
158
172
142
114
88
90

